[EM] Election-Methods Digest, Vol 90, Issue 42

[David L Wetzell]

[quote]Well said. Yes, "deviously dishonest" is the right description for
FairVote's tactics. Having someone like Rob Richie as the high-profile
well-funded "representative" of electoral reform in this country is
a big embarrassment for electoral reform.

Mike Ossipoff[/quote]

Rob Richie has great gifts in organizational leadership and the design and
marketing of electoral reform.  He's no slacker in electoral analytics but
he doesn't give theory too much weight.

It is unwise to attack him, when you all don't really have wherewithal
organizationally and rhetorically to replace him.

Like I wrote, when we get electoral reform, there'll be great scope for
consideration of electoral alternatives, but right now it's best to be good
soldiers united against FPTP and the Democracy In Name Only due to the
nearly exclusive use of single-winner elections in the US.

dlw
On Fri, Dec 16, 2011 at 3:30 PM, <
election-methods-request at lists.electorama.com> wrote:

> Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to
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> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
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>
> Today's Topics:
>
>   1. Oops! Errors in GMAT definition. Correct definition.
>      (MIKE OSSIPOFF)
>   2. You gave the right description of FairVote (MIKE OSSIPOFF)
>   3. how primary forecasts work (David L Wetzell)
>   4. Re: MMT: You're evading my questions. I didn't ask for
>      repetition about generalities. (MIKE OSSIPOFF)
>   5. Chicken or Egg re: Kathy Dopp (David L Wetzell)
>
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: MIKE OSSIPOFF <nkklrp at hotmail.com>
> To: <election-methods at electorama.com>
> Cc:
> Date: Fri, 16 Dec 2011 20:15:20 +0000
> Subject: [EM] Oops! Errors in GMAT definition. Correct definition.
>
>
>
> Here is the correct definition of GMAT, the one that I meant to post
> before:
>
> Greatest-Mutual-Approval-Top (GMAT):
>
> A mutual approval set is a set of candidates all of whom are rated
> above bottom by each member of the same set of ballots--where, for each
> ballot in that set, the set of candidates includes at least one of that
> ballot's top-rated candidates.
>
> If there is at least one mutual approval set for which the number of
> ballots
> rating all of its members above bottom is greater than the number of
> ballots
> rating at top anyone outside that set, then the winner is the most
> top-rated
> candidate in the mutual approval set with the most ballots voting all its
> members above bottom.
>
> Otherwise, the winner is the most top-rated candidate.
>
> [end of GMAT definition]
>
> Though the requirements for the winning set aren't much more complicated
> than those in MMT, the wording becomes quite a bit longer and more
> complicated.
>
> That's why, as I said, I consider MMT to be the best public proposal,
> even though it doesn't meet Mono-Add-Plump. For reasons I discussed before,
> I don't feel that MMT's Mono-Add-Plump will seem unfair, surprising or
> wrong
> to people.
>
> Mike Ossipoff
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: MIKE OSSIPOFF <nkklrp at hotmail.com>
> To: <election-methods at electorama.com>
> Cc:
> Date: Fri, 16 Dec 2011 20:29:54 +0000
> Subject: [EM] You gave the right description of FairVote
>
> Kathy Dop wrote:
>
> Actually, if we support the adoption of proportional representation,
> it is a good reason to strongly oppose IRV and STV which will sour the
> public on any notions of changing US electoral systems for decades and
> greatly hinder any progress towards proportional systems.  We've
> already seen this occur in jurisdictions where IRV has been tried and
> rejected when it was noticed how overly complex, transparency
> eviscerating, and fundamentally unfair IRV methods are.  Right now
> there is a push to get rid of it in San Franscisco.  IRV was tried
> decades ago in NYC and stopped progress there for decades.
>
> IRV/STV methods introduce problems plurality does not have and do not
> solve any of plurality's problems, so it's a great way to convince
> people not to implement any new electoral method and show people how
> deviously dishonest the proponents of alternative electoral methods
> can be.  (Fair Vote lied to people by convincing them that IRV finds
> majority winners and solves the spoiler problem, would save money, and
> on and on...)
>
> [endquote]
>
> Well said. Yes, "deviously dishonest" is the right description for
> FairVote's tactics. Having someone like Rob Richie as the high-profile
> well-funded "representative" of electoral reform in this country is
> a big embarrassment for electoral reform.
>
> Mike Ossipoff
>
>
>
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: David L Wetzell <wetzelld at gmail.com>
> To: election-methods at lists.electorama.com
> Cc:
> Date: Fri, 16 Dec 2011 15:14:19 -0600
> Subject: [EM] how primary forecasts work
>
> http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/16/how-our-primary-forecasts-work/
>
> this is interesting and raises the issue of how things wd change when an
> alternative election rule is used.
>
> I think the uncertainty would go up.
>
> dlw
>
> On Fri, Dec 16, 2011 at 2:02 PM, <
> election-methods-request at lists.electorama.com> wrote:
>
>> Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to
>>        election-methods at lists.electorama.com
>>
>> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
>>
>> http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com
>>
>> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
>>        election-methods-request at lists.electorama.com
>>
>> You can reach the person managing the list at
>>        election-methods-owner at lists.electorama.com
>>
>> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
>> than "Re: Contents of Election-Methods digest..."
>>
>> Today's Topics:
>>
>>   1. Greatest-Mutual -Approval-Top (GMAT) (MIKE OSSIPOFF)
>>
>>
>> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>> From: MIKE OSSIPOFF <nkklrp at hotmail.com>
>> To: <election-methods at electorama.com>
>> Cc:
>> Date: Fri, 16 Dec 2011 19:58:39 +0000
>> Subject: [EM] Greatest-Mutual -Approval-Top (GMAT)
>>
>> Greatest-Mutual-Approval-Top (GMAT):
>>
>> (like MMT except that it requires only greatest mutual approval
>> instead of majority mutual approval)
>>
>> A mutual approval set is a set of candidates all of whom are rated
>> above bottom by each member of the same majority of the voters--where
>> that set includes, for each ballot, at least one of that ballot's
>> top-rated candidates.
>>
>> If there is a mutual approval set all of whose members are rated above
>> bottom by more voters than rate anyone else top, then the winner is the
>> most top-rated member of that set.
>>
>> Otherwise the winner is the most top-rated candidate.
>>
>> [end of GMAT definition]
>>
>> GMAT meets FBC, avoids the ABE problem, provides majority rule protection,
>> and meets Mono-Add-Plump.
>>
>> Methods that substitute something else for majority often seem to
>> add a little longer wording, or add a little wording complexity.
>>
>> Therefore, I consider MMT to be the best public proposal. But GMAT is
>> my 2nd choice for best public proposal.
>>
>> Mike Ossipoff
>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Election-Methods mailing list
>> Election-Methods at lists.electorama.com
>> http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com
>>
>>
>
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: MIKE OSSIPOFF <nkklrp at hotmail.com>
> To: <election-methods at electorama.com>
> Cc:
> Date: Fri, 16 Dec 2011 21:16:55 +0000
> Subject: Re: [EM] MMT: You're evading my questions. I didn't ask for
> repetition about generalities.
>
> Chris:
>
> You said:
>
> In an earlier message of yours (the last one I responded to) you wrote:
>
> > MAMT is an addition to the list of FBC/ABE methods to choose from.
> > People should be looking into its properties. Tell me what you know,
> > so far, about its properties, ...
>
>
> That is almost the only thing I did. You didn't ask me to confine myself
> to properties that I personally think are *important* or to explain why
> I think they are important.
>
> [endquote]
>
> I wasn't criticizing you there. I was merely asking Forest about MAMT.
>
>  > You said that MMT fails Later-No-Help:
> >
> >  With MMT, you can help your favorite by entering into a mutually-chosen,
> >  mutually-supported, majority coalition. Everyone supporting that
> > coalition
> >  does so because they consider it beneficial to their interest.
> >
> >  How is that a "failure"??
>
> You replied:
>
> I assume you know what the criterion specifies and are asking me why
> meeting Later-no-Help is a good thing.
>
> [endquote]
>
> You assume wrong. I meant what I said. Re-read the last two paragraphs of
> mine
> that you quoted above. If you don't have an answer to it, then that's ok. I
> accept that you don't.
>
> No, I'm not asking you about generalities regarding a criterion. I'm asking
> specifically who is wronged by the situation that I described.
>
> You continued:
>
> Failing LNHelp while meeting
> LHHarm creates a random-fill incentive.
>  One of the problems with that is
> that is unfair to sincere truncators. Why should they be penalised for
> declining to play silly games with candidates they don't care about?
> Another is that all methods that fail LNHelp are vulnerable to Burial
> strategy.
>
> [endquote]
>
> That's what I mean by repetition of generalities such as your criteria,
> and such as "unfair to sincere truncators" and "burial strategy", etc.
>
> I asked you specifically about situations with MMT. I asked who is wronged
> therein.
> I didn't ask for repetition about generalities.
>
> I've told why your criteria, and your terms such as those in the paragraph
> before
> last, don't describe problems with MMT results and situations.
>
>
>  > You said that MMT fails Mutual Dominant 3rd:
> >
> >  I don't know what that criterion is.
>
> It is a weakened version of Smith that is compatible with LNHelp
> compliance (and so Burial Invulnerability) and also compliance with
> LNHarm. It says that that if there is a subset S of candidates that on
> more than a third of the ballots are voted strictly above all the
> outside-S candidates and all the S candidates pairwise-beat all the
> outside-S candidates then the winner must come from S.
>
>  From your recent past statements I know I don't have to sell the
> desirability of compliance with this to you. I gave this example:
>
> 49: A
> 48: B
> 03: C>B
>
> I can't take seriously any method that doesn't elect B here. Can you?
> Isn't this just the sort of small (probably wing) "spoiler" scenario
> that motivates many to support electoral reform?
>
> [endquote]
>
> B pairwise beats A, and is CW. Condorcet's Criterion is incompatible
> with FBC. Various different FBC-complying methods, and especially FBC/ABE
> methods, will fail CC in various ways, some CC failures being bigger than
> others--a matter of degree. But they all fail CC. Maybe you're a strict
> Condorcetist, and I don't criticize you for that. We needn't all have the
> same goals, values and purposes.
>
> In your example, there's something favoring A and there's something
> favoting B.
> A is better in 1st choice ratings. B has more (1st place + 2nd place)
> support. It's
> a toss-up, unless your goal is to elect the pairwise winner and the CW.
>
>  > You said that MMT fails Mono-Add-Plump:
> >
> >  I've already commented on that a few times.
>
>
> Yes, and I obliquely responded to your comment. But to be blunt, if
> failure of Mono-add-Plump isn't self-evidently *completely ridiculous*
> (and so much so that anything not compatible with Mono-add-Plump
> compliance is thereby made a complete nonsense of), then I have no idea
> what is.
>
> [endquote]
>
> Not good enough. I asked you specifically what is wrong with situations and
> results that I described for MMT.
>
> Angry noises may serve to vent your anger, but they don't answer my
> question.
>
> Could it be that you're evading my questions about what is wrong, unfair
> or surprising about the MMT situations and results that I asked you about?
>
> You continued:
>
>
> This doesn't come anywhere near cutting it:
>
> > Your favorite initially won only because of mutual majority support.
> > The plumpers
> > declined that mutual support, as is their right. Having declined
> > mutual support,
> > should it be surprising or unfair if they no longer have it?
>
> Is it "surprising or unfair" that some new voters should in effect have
> their ballots given negative weight because they refused to play silly
> games with some candidates they weren't interested in and maybe knew
> nothing about?
>
> Err....*yes*.
>
>
> [endquote]
>
> Err...You mean "silly games like mutual majority coalition support? :-)
>
> If they think that is silly, then they certainly have the right to decline
> it...
> and then not benefit from it.
>
>
> Mike Ossipoff
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: David L Wetzell <wetzelld at gmail.com>
> To: EM <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>
> Cc:
> Date: Fri, 16 Dec 2011 15:29:30 -0600
> Subject: [EM] Chicken or Egg re: Kathy Dopp
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: Kathy Dopp <kathy.dopp at gmail.com>
> To: election-methods at lists.electorama.com
> Cc:
> Date: Fri, 16 Dec 2011 09:11:11 -0500
> Subject: Re: [EM] Egg or Chicken.
> > Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2011 14:59:14 -0600
> > From: David L Wetzell <wetzelld at gmail.com>
> >
> > if we push hard for the use of American Proportional Representation it'll
> > give third parties a better chance to win seats and they will prove great
> > labs for experimentation with electoral reform.
> >
> > This is also a good reason to strategically support IRV, since we can
> trust
> > that with changes, there'll be more scope for experimentation and
> > consideration of multiple alternatives to FPTP.
>
> KD:Actually, if we support the adoption of proportional representation,
> it is a good reason to strongly oppose IRV and STV which will sour the
> public on any notions of changing US electoral systems for decades and
> greatly hinder any progress towards proportional systems.
>
> dlw: That is what is in dispute.
>
> KD:We've already seen this occur in jurisdictions where IRV has been
> tried and
> rejected when it was noticed how overly complex, transparency
> eviscerating, and fundamentally unfair IRV methods are.  Right now
> there is a push to get rid of it in San Franscisco.  IRV was tried
> decades ago in NYC and stopped progress there for decades.
>
> dlw: Unfair?  Why because it emulates the workings of a caucus by
> considering only one vote per voter at a time?
>
> dlw: If a 2-stage approach is used then it's less complex and the results
> can be tabulated at the precinct level.
>
> dlw: I'm sure the Cold War red scare stopped progress in NYC and elsewhere
> a lot more than "IRV"....
>
> KD: IRV/STV methods introduce problems plurality does not have and do not
> solve any of plurality's problems, so it's a great way to convince
> people not to implement any new electoral method and show people how
> deviously dishonest the proponents of alternative electoral methods
> can be.  (Fair Vote lied to people by convincing them that IRV finds
> majority winners and solves the spoiler problem, would save money, and
> on and on...)
>
> dlw: It's called marketing.  FairVote wisely simplified the benefits of
> IRV.  IRV does find majority winners a lot more often than FPTP and it
> reduces the spoiler problem considerably.  It does save money compared with
> a two round approach and its' "problems" are easy to fix.
>
> dlw
>
> Kathy Dopp
> http://electionmathematics.org
> Town of Colonie, NY 12304
> "One of the best ways to keep any conversation civil is to support the
> discussion with true facts."
> "Renewable energy is homeland security."
>
> Fundamentals of Verifiable Elections
> http://kathydopp.com/wordpress/?p=174
>
> View some of my research on my SSRN Author page:
> http://ssrn.com/author=1451051
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Election-Methods mailing list
> Election-Methods at lists.electorama.com
> http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com
>
>
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