[EM] Forest: I found an FBC failure for Minimal Aquiescing Majorities-Top

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

Forest--

Say it's like the ABE, except that there's one more candidate, D.

In the ABE, you were an A voter, but now, with D in the election, you like D best, 
with A your 2nd choice.

(Say all the A voters vote as you do)

The B voters, while willing to middle-rate A for a majority coalition, wouldn't
be willing to miiddle-rate D.

If you vote A & D together in 1st place, then your top-rating for D means that
{A,B} is no longer a winning set, because you vote D over B.

If you vote in that way, C wins.

But you can at least make A win, because the B voters are willing to middle-rate A.

You can do that by top-rating only A. You can middle-rate D if you want to.

Then, {A,B} wins, and, in that set, A wins with the most top votes.

You can get your best possible outcome (the election of A) only by voting someone over
your favorite.

Mike Ossipoff

 		 	   		  
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20111214/791e55de/attachment-0003.htm>