[EM] Voting reform statement

[Jameson Quinn]

2011/8/16 Dave Ketchum <davek at clarityconnect.com>

> On Aug 16, 2011, at 9:16 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>
> I understand your arguments, though you've neglected MJ and SODA. But as I
> keep arguing, this statement isn't about finding the right answer, it's
> about finding the best answer that we can all agree on.
>
> JQ
>
> 2011/8/15 Dave Ketchum <davek at clarityconnect.com>
>
>> Strategy thoughts:
>>
>> Assuming as candidates, Good, Soso, and lice:  My preference is G but S is
>> better than any lice.  Thus I desire to vote for both G and S with G
>> preferred.
>>
>
> While a voter can often identify one target for all their attention, or
> more which share being best liked, I see my description of G and S as
> identifying a common other major desire.
>
> SODA?  If, when a voter lists multiple candidates, they are treated as in
> approval, I see SODA as grouping with approval.
>

If a voter agrees with their preferred candidate's declared preference order
- which will almost certainly be the case for a plurality, and probably for
a majority, of each candidate's voters - then SODA allows the simple bullet
vote for G to be strategically-optimal in electing S. So yes, there will be
a minority of voters, perhaps a small minority, who will be still faced with
the dilemmas of approval. But I think that resolving the dilemma for a
majority is important enough to deserve separate mention.


>
> MJ?  J am not sure what this is - would it, like many, fit among what I
> have described?  For example there are many flavors of Condorcet of varying
> quality, though not worth mentioning in the current effort (yet I see IRV as
> different enough to deserve mention).
>

MJ is Majority Judgment. It is defined similar to Range, except that instead
of the candidate with the highest average score winning, it is the one with
the highest median score. This apparently-simple change has very important
implications in terms of strategy; so until you've at least skimmed one of
the papers at http://sites.google.com/site/ridalaraki/majority-judgment ,
please do not make assumptions based on your understanding of Range voting.

Bottom line:

For Approval and Range, most voters must do some amount of strategic
thinking. For SODA, MJ, and Condorcet, most voters can vote a
strategically-optimal sincere vote. I've looked at various studies of how
likely that is (
http://sites.google.com/site/ridalaraki/xfiles/BalinskiLarakiExperiEvid%28LastVersion%29.pdf?attredirects=0,
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/CPNSS/projects/VPP/VPPpdf/VPPpdf_Wshop2010/Workshop%20Papers/duBaffy2010_Laslier.pdf,
http://books.google.com/books?id=RN5q_LuByUoC ) and my informed opinion is
that, if anything, SODA and MJ are less likely to require strategic thinking
from any given voter or party than Condorcet is.

Jameson

>
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20110816/f6207911/attachment-0004.htm>