[EM] Voting reform statement

Dave Ketchum davek at clarityconnect.com
Tue Aug 16 10:22:13 PDT 2011


On Aug 16, 2011, at 9:16 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:

> I understand your arguments, though you've neglected MJ and SODA.  
> But as I keep arguing, this statement isn't about finding the right  
> answer, it's about finding the best answer that we can all agree on.
>
> JQ
>
> 2011/8/15 Dave Ketchum <davek at clarityconnect.com>
> Strategy thoughts:
>
> Assuming as candidates, Good, Soso, and lice:  My preference is G  
> but S is better than any lice.  Thus I desire to vote for both G and  
> S with G preferred.

While a voter can often identify one target for all their attention,  
or more which share being best liked, I see my description of G and S  
as identifying a common other major desire.

SODA?  If, when a voter lists multiple candidates, they are treated as  
in approval, I see SODA as grouping with approval.

MJ?  J am not sure what this is - would it, like many, fit among what  
I have described?  For example there are many flavors of Condorcet of  
varying quality, though not worth mentioning in the current effort  
(yet I see IRV as different enough to deserve mention).

Dave Ketchum
>
> Plurality - can not vote for both.  On days when I expect G to  
> certainly lose I vote for S to protect, as best I can, against lice.
>
> Approval - can vote for both but this can cause G to lose.  Simple  
> rules and a bit better than plurality.
>
> IRV - can vote for both.  Vote counting is both much labor and can  
> fail to elect G even though best liked, if this is not seen by the  
> way the counters look at the ballots.
>
> Range - can vote for both.  After giving G top rating, S has a  
> strategy headache: Rate S high and risk S winning over G; rate S low  
> and risk S losing to lice.
>
> Condorcet - can vote for both and show clear preference for G over S.
>
> On Aug 15, 2011, at 9:20 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>> 2011/8/15 Jonathan Lundell <jlundell at pobox.com>
>> On Aug 15, 2011, at 11:58 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>>
>>> It's true that I might agree to a statement if all it said were  
>>> "We believe that approval is marginally superior to  
>>> plurality" (thought to the extent that I agreed, I don't think  
>>> it's enough better to merit any energy in advocating it). But  
>>> that's not what you're proposing. Is it?
>>>
>>>
>>> No. I'm proposing saying that, in different words, along with a  
>>> number of other things with which you haven't disagreed. Including  
>>> that we believe that approval is a step towards systems which we  
>>> see as significantly superior to plurality. (Remember - just as  
>>> approval is 2-level Range, approval is also 2-level Schulze or  
>>> what have you, and also no-intercandidate-preference SODA, etc.)  
>>> So, either propose some specific change in the language relating  
>>> to approval, or bring some other objection, or both.
>>>
>>
>> The statement says, in effect, "Range is good, IRV is bad". I  
>> disagree.
>>
>> Perhaps I'm the only one, in which case it's inconsequential that  
>> I'm not aboard.
>>
>> (What Schulze are we talking about? I associate the name with a  
>> Condorcet-cycle-breaking method.)
>>
>> It doesn't say that. It says, we can agree that range is at least  
>> marginally better than plurality, we cannot agree on that for IRV.  
>> I would happily sign a separate statement saying IRV is better than  
>> plurality, but I think including that here would lose too many.
>>
>> Schulze is just my default example of a complex but good Condorcet  
>> tiebreaker. And if you run it with only two-level ballots, it is  
>> equivalent to approval.
>>
>> If you want to suggest rewording to make it clear that you're only  
>> giving the weakest possible endorsement to Range, then go ahead.  
>> But remember, any amount you weaken the "these are good systems"  
>> section, weakens it for all of the listed systems. Because we are  
>> not going to get many people to sign on to a statement that makes  
>> distinctions between those systems.
>>
>> Or say clearly that you can't sign the statement in any form, and  
>> we'll stop worrying about you. I want this to get as much support  
>> as possible, but I know that I'll never get everyone.
>>
>> Again, I personally agree with much of what you are saying.  
>> Approval does force strategic thinking on the voter, more than many  
>> other options. (That's also true of Range, but not of MJ, so you  
>> shouldn't generalize to "rating systems".) But this is not about  
>> just me.
>>
>> JQ
>

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