[EM] Voting reform statement

Jameson Quinn jameson.quinn at gmail.com
Tue Aug 16 06:16:36 PDT 2011


I understand your arguments, though you've neglected MJ and SODA. But as I
keep arguing, this statement isn't about finding the right answer, it's
about finding the best answer that we can all agree on.

JQ

2011/8/15 Dave Ketchum <davek at clarityconnect.com>

> Strategy thoughts:
>
> Assuming as candidates, Good, Soso, and lice:  My preference is G but S is
> better than any lice.  Thus I desire to vote for both G and S with G
> preferred.
>
> Plurality - can not vote for both.  On days when I expect G to certainly
> lose I vote for S to protect, as best I can, against lice.
>
> Approval - can vote for both but this can cause G to lose.  Simple rules
> and a bit better than plurality.
>
> IRV - can vote for both.  Vote counting is both much labor and can fail to
> elect G even though best liked, if this is not seen by the way the counters
> look at the ballots.
>
> Range - can vote for both.  After giving G top rating, S has a strategy
> headache: Rate S high and risk S winning over G; rate S low and risk S
> losing to lice.
>
> Condorcet - can vote for both and show clear preference for G over S.
>
> On Aug 15, 2011, at 9:20 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>
> 2011/8/15 Jonathan Lundell <jlundell at pobox.com>
>
>> On Aug 15, 2011, at 11:58 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>>
>> It's true that I might agree to a statement if all it said were "We
>>> believe that approval is marginally superior to plurality" (thought to the
>>> extent that I agreed, I don't think it's enough better to merit any energy
>>> in advocating it). But that's not what you're proposing. Is it?
>>>
>>>
>> No. I'm proposing saying that, in different words, along with a number of
>> other things with which you haven't disagreed. Including that we believe
>> that approval is a step towards systems which we see as significantly
>> superior to plurality. (Remember - just as approval is 2-level Range,
>> approval is also 2-level Schulze or what have you, and also
>> no-intercandidate-preference SODA, etc.) So, either propose some specific
>> change in the language relating to approval, or bring some other objection,
>> or both.
>>
>>
>> The statement says, in effect, "Range is good, IRV is bad". I disagree.
>>
>> Perhaps I'm the only one, in which case it's inconsequential that I'm not
>> aboard.
>>
>> (What Schulze are we talking about? I associate the name with a
>> Condorcet-cycle-breaking method.)
>>
>> It doesn't say that. It says, we can agree that range is at least
> marginally better than plurality, we cannot agree on that for IRV. I would
> happily sign a separate statement saying IRV is better than plurality, but I
> think including that here would lose too many.
>
> Schulze is just my default example of a complex but good Condorcet
> tiebreaker. And if you run it with only two-level ballots, it is equivalent
> to approval.
>
> If you want to suggest rewording to make it clear that you're only giving
> the weakest possible endorsement to Range, then go ahead. But remember, any
> amount you weaken the "these are good systems" section, weakens it for all
> of the listed systems. Because we are not going to get many people to sign
> on to a statement that makes distinctions between those systems.
>
> Or say clearly that you can't sign the statement in any form, and we'll
> stop worrying about you. I want this to get as much support as possible, but
> I know that I'll never get everyone.
>
> Again, I personally agree with much of what you are saying. Approval does
> force strategic thinking on the voter, more than many other options. (That's
> also true of Range, but not of MJ, so you shouldn't generalize to "rating
> systems".) But this is not about just me.
>
> JQ
>
>
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