[EM] Voting reform statement

[Dave Ketchum]

Strategy thoughts:

Assuming as candidates, Good, Soso, and lice:  My preference is G but  
S is better than any lice.  Thus I desire to vote for both G and S  
with G preferred.

Plurality - can not vote for both.  On days when I expect G to  
certainly lose I vote for S to protect, as best I can, against lice.

Approval - can vote for both but this can cause G to lose.  Simple  
rules and a bit better than plurality.

IRV - can vote for both.  Vote counting is both much labor and can  
fail to elect G even though best liked, if this is not seen by the way  
the counters look at the ballots.

Range - can vote for both.  After giving G top rating, S has a  
strategy headache: Rate S high and risk S winning over G; rate S low  
and risk S losing to lice.

Condorcet - can vote for both and show clear preference for G over S.

On Aug 15, 2011, at 9:20 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
> 2011/8/15 Jonathan Lundell <jlundell at pobox.com>
> On Aug 15, 2011, at 11:58 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>
>> It's true that I might agree to a statement if all it said were "We  
>> believe that approval is marginally superior to plurality" (thought  
>> to the extent that I agreed, I don't think it's enough better to  
>> merit any energy in advocating it). But that's not what you're  
>> proposing. Is it?
>>
>>
>> No. I'm proposing saying that, in different words, along with a  
>> number of other things with which you haven't disagreed. Including  
>> that we believe that approval is a step towards systems which we  
>> see as significantly superior to plurality. (Remember - just as  
>> approval is 2-level Range, approval is also 2-level Schulze or what  
>> have you, and also no-intercandidate-preference SODA, etc.) So,  
>> either propose some specific change in the language relating to  
>> approval, or bring some other objection, or both.
>>
>
> The statement says, in effect, "Range is good, IRV is bad". I  
> disagree.
>
> Perhaps I'm the only one, in which case it's inconsequential that  
> I'm not aboard.
>
> (What Schulze are we talking about? I associate the name with a  
> Condorcet-cycle-breaking method.)
>
> It doesn't say that. It says, we can agree that range is at least  
> marginally better than plurality, we cannot agree on that for IRV. I  
> would happily sign a separate statement saying IRV is better than  
> plurality, but I think including that here would lose too many.
>
> Schulze is just my default example of a complex but good Condorcet  
> tiebreaker. And if you run it with only two-level ballots, it is  
> equivalent to approval.
>
> If you want to suggest rewording to make it clear that you're only  
> giving the weakest possible endorsement to Range, then go ahead. But  
> remember, any amount you weaken the "these are good systems"  
> section, weakens it for all of the listed systems. Because we are  
> not going to get many people to sign on to a statement that makes  
> distinctions between those systems.
>
> Or say clearly that you can't sign the statement in any form, and  
> we'll stop worrying about you. I want this to get as much support as  
> possible, but I know that I'll never get everyone.
>
> Again, I personally agree with much of what you are saying. Approval  
> does force strategic thinking on the voter, more than many other  
> options. (That's also true of Range, but not of MJ, so you shouldn't  
> generalize to "rating systems".) But this is not about just me.
>
> JQ
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