[EM] Voting reform statement

[Jameson Quinn]

I've made this draft statement into a google
doc<https://docs.google.com/document/d/1oyJLxI9dciXBbowM5mougnbGHzkL3Ue1QkD8nnMwWLg/edit?hl=en_US>
:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1oyJLxI9dciXBbowM5mougnbGHzkL3Ue1QkD8nnMwWLg/edit?hl=en_US

Probably we should continue to discuss here for a while longer, but feel
free to also make suggested changes over there. (There are some "ground
rules" at the top of the doc, and I trust the people here to act
responsibly.)

JQ

2011/8/16 Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>

> I understand your arguments, though you've neglected MJ and SODA. But as I
> keep arguing, this statement isn't about finding the right answer, it's
> about finding the best answer that we can all agree on.
>
> JQ
>
>
> 2011/8/15 Dave Ketchum <davek at clarityconnect.com>
>
>> Strategy thoughts:
>>
>> Assuming as candidates, Good, Soso, and lice:  My preference is G but S is
>> better than any lice.  Thus I desire to vote for both G and S with G
>> preferred.
>>
>> Plurality - can not vote for both.  On days when I expect G to certainly
>> lose I vote for S to protect, as best I can, against lice.
>>
>> Approval - can vote for both but this can cause G to lose.  Simple rules
>> and a bit better than plurality.
>>
>> IRV - can vote for both.  Vote counting is both much labor and can fail to
>> elect G even though best liked, if this is not seen by the way the counters
>> look at the ballots.
>>
>> Range - can vote for both.  After giving G top rating, S has a strategy
>> headache: Rate S high and risk S winning over G; rate S low and risk S
>> losing to lice.
>>
>> Condorcet - can vote for both and show clear preference for G over S.
>>
>> On Aug 15, 2011, at 9:20 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>>
>> 2011/8/15 Jonathan Lundell <jlundell at pobox.com>
>>
>>> On Aug 15, 2011, at 11:58 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>>>
>>> It's true that I might agree to a statement if all it said were "We
>>>> believe that approval is marginally superior to plurality" (thought to the
>>>> extent that I agreed, I don't think it's enough better to merit any energy
>>>> in advocating it). But that's not what you're proposing. Is it?
>>>>
>>>>
>>> No. I'm proposing saying that, in different words, along with a number of
>>> other things with which you haven't disagreed. Including that we believe
>>> that approval is a step towards systems which we see as significantly
>>> superior to plurality. (Remember - just as approval is 2-level Range,
>>> approval is also 2-level Schulze or what have you, and also
>>> no-intercandidate-preference SODA, etc.) So, either propose some specific
>>> change in the language relating to approval, or bring some other objection,
>>> or both.
>>>
>>>
>>> The statement says, in effect, "Range is good, IRV is bad". I disagree.
>>>
>>> Perhaps I'm the only one, in which case it's inconsequential that I'm not
>>> aboard.
>>>
>>> (What Schulze are we talking about? I associate the name with a
>>> Condorcet-cycle-breaking method.)
>>>
>>> It doesn't say that. It says, we can agree that range is at least
>> marginally better than plurality, we cannot agree on that for IRV. I would
>> happily sign a separate statement saying IRV is better than plurality, but I
>> think including that here would lose too many.
>>
>> Schulze is just my default example of a complex but good Condorcet
>> tiebreaker. And if you run it with only two-level ballots, it is equivalent
>> to approval.
>>
>> If you want to suggest rewording to make it clear that you're only giving
>> the weakest possible endorsement to Range, then go ahead. But remember, any
>> amount you weaken the "these are good systems" section, weakens it for all
>> of the listed systems. Because we are not going to get many people to sign
>> on to a statement that makes distinctions between those systems.
>>
>> Or say clearly that you can't sign the statement in any form, and we'll
>> stop worrying about you. I want this to get as much support as possible, but
>> I know that I'll never get everyone.
>>
>> Again, I personally agree with much of what you are saying. Approval does
>> force strategic thinking on the voter, more than many other options. (That's
>> also true of Range, but not of MJ, so you shouldn't generalize to "rating
>> systems".) But this is not about just me.
>>
>> JQ
>>
>>
>
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