[EM] Voting Reform Statement

[Jameson Quinn]

2011/8/15 <fsimmons at pcc.edu>

>
> > The study of voting systems has made significant progress over
> > the last
> > decade, and our understanding is even farther beyond what it was
> > 20 years
> > ago. One important place where that has happened is on the
> > election methods
> > mailing list. This mailing list is likely to include the largest
> > and most
> > diverse group of voting systems theorists in the world. It is a
> > place where
> > opinions vary and debate is vigorous. Thus, we think that the
> > broad, though
> > imperfect, consensus on the following ideas is worth paying
> > attention to.
> >
> > We believe that the voting systems currently used in most of the
> > English-speaking world, including single-round plurality voting
> > (also termed
> > First Past the Post, FPTP) and single-member districts (aka
> > seats, ridings,
> > or electorates), represent some of the worst voting systems
> > known. We
> > believe that reforming these systems would provide important societal
> > benefits, and that there are clearly not corresponding reasons
> > to oppose
> > such reform from the perspective of the public interest. We may
> > disagreeabout which specific reforms might provide the
> > absolutely optimum results,
> > but we can nevertheless agree that there are a number of options
> > which would
> > represent worthwhile improvements.
> >
> > *Single-winner reform*
> >
> > There are various criteria, both formally-defined and informal,
> > by which one
> > can judge a voting system. These criteria can be divided into several
> > classes:
> >
> > 1. Honest-results-oriented criteria. These include such measures
> > as Bayesian
> > regret (that is, simulated societal satisfaction), the majority
> > criterion,and the Condorcet criterion, which focus on whether
> > the "correct" candidate,
> > according to some definition, is elected. Although these
> > criteria in some
> > cases can favor different candidates as being "correct", in most
> > practicalcases they agree.
> >
> > 2. Strategy-resistance criteria. Voting is a complex process,
> > and inevitably
> > there are some cases where some group could get an advantage by
> > changingtheir votes. It is desirable to keep such cases to a
> > minimum. For one
> > thing, it's fairer not to reward such strategic voting behavior.
> > But it's
> > not just that. Perhaps more importantly, a voting system which
> > gives too
> > much of an incentive to strategic voters, can lead to widespread
> > strategywhich systematically distorts the results.
> >
> > 3. Process-oriented criteria. These include such measures as
> > simplicity of
> > the ballot, simplicity of the ballot-counting process, and
> > feasibility of
> > auditing or other fraud-prevention measures.
> >
> > 4. Candidate-incentive criteria. Systems which encourage or discourage
> > "clone candidates"; give too much power to parties, as opposed
> > to voters;
> > have problems here. These criteria also include less strictly-defined
> > concerns about the type of candidates and campaign strategies a system
> > encourages; for instance, systems which effectively reduce the
> > field to 2
> > major candidates could encourage negative advertising.
> >
> > There is a broad consensus among researchers plurality voting is
> > among the
> > worst systems for honest results, for strategy-resistance, and
> > for candidate
> > incentives. Honest voting can split votes among similar candidates,
> > "spoiling" the election and leading opposing candidates to win. Voters
> > respond by strategically choosing the "lesser evil" among the
> > two major
> > candidates, which can lead to complacent candidates because even
> > corrupt,widely-disliked candidates can win. The system
> > discourages candidates from
> > entering the race, and encourages negative advertising. Although
> > pluralityhas good simplicity and fraud-resistance, this is not
> > enough to recommend
> > its use.
> >
> > A number of proposed single-winner replacements for plurality exist.
> > Although theorists can not find consensus about which of these
> > systems is
> > best, we can agree that many of them are clearly head-and-
> > shoulders above
> > plurality. Systems advanced as as best by some of us, and
> > accepted as good
> > by all of us, include (in categorical and alphabetical order):
> >
>
> Put Approval Voting here in alphabetical order,


Is there anyone who feels that Approval is better than all the other systems
listed here? I think that's true for each of the others; the list is
supposed to be systems someone thinks are best and (almost) no-one
(reasonably) thinks are worse than plurality.


> and mention that each of the
> following methods is a generalization of Approval in a slightly different
> direction.  In other words all of the most highly esteemed methods on the
> EM
> list turn out to be generalizations of Approval  I know that you made this
> point
> in a slightly different way, but it could easily be passed over without
> registering mentally if we are not careful.
>

OK, that's a good suggestion. We'll do that when we get to editing details.

JQ
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