[EM] Voting Reform Statement

[fsimmons at pcc.edu]

> The study of voting systems has made significant progress over
> the last
> decade, and our understanding is even farther beyond what it was
> 20 years
> ago. One important place where that has happened is on the
> election methods
> mailing list. This mailing list is likely to include the largest
> and most
> diverse group of voting systems theorists in the world. It is a
> place where
> opinions vary and debate is vigorous. Thus, we think that the
> broad, though
> imperfect, consensus on the following ideas is worth paying
> attention to.
>
> We believe that the voting systems currently used in most of the
> English-speaking world, including single-round plurality voting
> (also termed
> First Past the Post, FPTP) and single-member districts (aka
> seats, ridings,
> or electorates), represent some of the worst voting systems
> known. We
> believe that reforming these systems would provide important societal
> benefits, and that there are clearly not corresponding reasons
> to oppose
> such reform from the perspective of the public interest. We may
> disagreeabout which specific reforms might provide the
> absolutely optimum results,
> but we can nevertheless agree that there are a number of options
> which would
> represent worthwhile improvements.
>
> *Single-winner reform*
>
> There are various criteria, both formally-defined and informal,
> by which one
> can judge a voting system. These criteria can be divided into several
> classes:
>
> 1. Honest-results-oriented criteria. These include such measures
> as Bayesian
> regret (that is, simulated societal satisfaction), the majority
> criterion,and the Condorcet criterion, which focus on whether
> the "correct" candidate,
> according to some definition, is elected. Although these
> criteria in some
> cases can favor different candidates as being "correct", in most
> practicalcases they agree.
>
> 2. Strategy-resistance criteria. Voting is a complex process,
> and inevitably
> there are some cases where some group could get an advantage by
> changingtheir votes. It is desirable to keep such cases to a
> minimum. For one
> thing, it's fairer not to reward such strategic voting behavior.
> But it's
> not just that. Perhaps more importantly, a voting system which
> gives too
> much of an incentive to strategic voters, can lead to widespread
> strategywhich systematically distorts the results.
>
> 3. Process-oriented criteria. These include such measures as
> simplicity of
> the ballot, simplicity of the ballot-counting process, and
> feasibility of
> auditing or other fraud-prevention measures.
>
> 4. Candidate-incentive criteria. Systems which encourage or discourage
> "clone candidates"; give too much power to parties, as opposed
> to voters;
> have problems here. These criteria also include less strictly-defined
> concerns about the type of candidates and campaign strategies a system
> encourages; for instance, systems which effectively reduce the
> field to 2
> major candidates could encourage negative advertising.
>
> There is a broad consensus among researchers plurality voting is
> among the
> worst systems for honest results, for strategy-resistance, and
> for candidate
> incentives. Honest voting can split votes among similar candidates,
> "spoiling" the election and leading opposing candidates to win. Voters
> respond by strategically choosing the "lesser evil" among the
> two major
> candidates, which can lead to complacent candidates because even
> corrupt,widely-disliked candidates can win. The system
> discourages candidates from
> entering the race, and encourages negative advertising. Although
> pluralityhas good simplicity and fraud-resistance, this is not
> enough to recommend
> its use.
>
> A number of proposed single-winner replacements for plurality exist.
> Although theorists can not find consensus about which of these
> systems is
> best, we can agree that many of them are clearly head-and-
> shoulders above
> plurality. Systems advanced as as best by some of us, and
> accepted as good
> by all of us, include (in categorical and alphabetical order):
>

Put Approval Voting here in alphabetical order, and mention that each of the
following methods is a generalization of Approval in a slightly different
direction.  In other words all of the most highly esteemed methods on the EM
list turn out to be generalizations of Approval  I know that you made this point
in a slightly different way, but it could easily be passed over without
registering mentally if we are not careful.

> - Various *Bucklin* or median-based systems such as *Majority
> Judgment* - Various *Condorcet* systems, including
> *Condorcet//Approval, various
> Condorcet//IRV hybrids, Ranked Pairs, *and* Schulze*.
> - *Range Voting* (aka Score Voting)
> - *SODA voting*
>
> Notably absent from the above list is IRV (aka Alternative Vote,