[EM] SODA and the Condorcet criterion

[Jameson Quinn]

2011/8/4 <fsimmons at pcc.edu>

> I want to thank Jameson for taking the ball and running with it on SODA.  I
> really appreciate his talented
> and energetic work on elaborating, explaining, and selling the method.
>

Thank you.

More stuff I've added to the SODA page recently:

-I tried to unify the terminology. Voters can "delegate" their votes;
Candidates receive "delegated votes" (not ballots), which they then "use" (I
had been using "assign", "exercise", or "share") by "approving" other
candidates, who in turn "receive" these "shared votes".

I'd be open to suggestions to improve any of those terms, though I think
consistency is more important than perfection.

-I revamped the section on Advantages, and added a section on Electoral
College compatibility. The latter contains proposed rules for using with the
EC, for which I'm open to refinements or suggestions.

Here are the sections as they stand:

Advantages

SODA has advantages for many groups. In fact, most of the advantages would
fit in more than one of the categories below, so the division is somewhat
arbitrary. Also, on the talk page (click "discussion" above) there are also
two "hard sell" SODA pitches for two different audiences, which restate
these advantages in more-opinionated terms.
 [edit<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/index.php?title=Simple_Optionally-Delegated_Approval&action=edit&section=10>
]For voters

   1. SODA is extremely easy for the voters; in fact, *no voting system is
   simpler to vote*. (Plurality, by restricting you to only one vote, also
   makes it possible to mistakenly "overvote", spoiling your ballot. There is
   no such way to accidentally invalidate your ballot under SODA. Also, both
   Plurality and Approval require a conscientious voter to consider strategy
   and polling status; SODA allows a simple bullet vote to still be
   strategically as strong as possible, regardless of the candidate standings.)
   2. Under SODA, there is *no need for dishonesty* from individual voters.
   A voter can safely vote for any candidate that they honestly agree with,
   without fear of that vote being wasted; or safely vote an honest
   approval-style ballot, if they do not agree with any candidate's preference
   order. This is drastically different from plurality, where voters must
   dishonestly spurn "spoiler" candidates as a matter of course.
   3. SODA *does not require you to trust any politician*. Any vote
   delegation is both safe (you can see where your delegated vote will go) and
   entirely optional. Any voter who dislikes the idea of their vote being
   delegated in a "smoke-filled room", need not allow that to happen.

[edit<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/index.php?title=Simple_Optionally-Delegated_Approval&action=edit&section=11>
]For society (results)

   1. SODA is far *more likely to arrive at a majority result* than
   Plurality (or even IRV). Winners will thus have a clearer mandate.
   2. SODA may be *more likely to elect the Condorcet winner* (aka pairwise
   champion, the candidate who could beat all others one-on-one) than *any
   other system* (except SODA-DAC <http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/DAC>).
   See the technical discussion in the prior section for the assumptions that
   would make this true.
   3. However, unexpected, relatively unknown or *unqualified winners will
   be as rare or rarer under SODA* than under Approval or a Condorcet
   system. In a polarized society, Condorcet can have such a strong tendency to
   elect centrists that even unqualified, largely-unknown centrists have an
   advantage over better-known candidates; SODA will not have such a tendency
   unless the stronger candidates consciously choose this as a compromise.

[edit<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/index.php?title=Simple_Optionally-Delegated_Approval&action=edit&section=12>
]For society (process)

   1. Leaders of *minority factions would have an appropriate voice for
   their concerns*, although power would ultimately reside with any majority
   coalition which exists. In fact, you could say that SODA combines the best
   of both worlds - the negotiated, everyone-gets-a-voice coalitions of
   parliamentary government, with the decisive, buck-stops-here clear winner of
   a US-style system.
   2. SODA would *reduce negative campaigns*. A negative attack against
   opponent A would often just shift votes to another opponent B who would end
   up sharing them back with A in the delegation round. Meanwhile, the
   candidate carrying out the attacks could also suffer with voters.
   3. Like many other voting reforms, SODA would *reduce the influence of
   money* in political campaigns. Plurality, with its overriding need to be
   a frontrunner, exaggerates the importance of money. SODA in particular, by
   encouraging meaningful campaigns and get-out-the-vote operations by minor
   candidates, while still ensuring that the extra turnout those generated
   would have an effective impact in deciding between the major candidates,
   would help substitute grassroots people-power for dollar-power in campaigns.

[edit<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/index.php?title=Simple_Optionally-Delegated_Approval&action=edit&section=13>
]For activists

   1. SODA is arguably *better than Plurality voting in every way* (Pareto
   dominant). Although other systems may offer even-greater advantages over
   plurality, they also come with certain disadvantages. Those disadvantages
   may be minor, but a supporter of such a system must waste time looking
   defensive in order to convince voters of that. A SODA advocate can devote
   all their attention to its advantages.
   2. SODA would lead to *less infighting*. Because it solves the spoiler
   problem, there's no need for pointless debate between radicals who want to
   pressure their side and moderates who want to support it. Substantive debate
   would continue, but with less need for unhelpful acrimony.
   3. Because it allows more voices in the debate, SODA would *support the
   passage of other reforms* such as *campaign finance reform*. The current
   two-party system sees these issues, which should be bipartisan, through a
   partisan lens, crippling their progress. By breaking the two-party monopoly,
   SODA would open the potential for more cross-partisan alliances and
   independent support on these matters.

[edit<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/index.php?title=Simple_Optionally-Delegated_Approval&action=edit&section=14>
]For politicians

   1. SODA should be generally *acceptable to honest officeholders*, who are
   winners in a Plurality two-party system. Most of their familiar ways of
   thinking about the campaign would still work - except that it would reduce
   negative campaigning, mentioned in the advantages for process.
   Plurality-style voting still works just fine, and if most votes are for
   major parties, this system will cleanly allow a major party to win, in many
   cases without going to the delegation round (especially if the major-party
   candidates do not pre-announce delegation preferences, thus preventing an
   extorting minor party from demanding their delegated votes; and/or if the
   optional anti-kingmaker rule is used).
   2. SODA would make a politician's job *more fun*. Less time spent on
   fundraising (see process advantage #3), fewer attack ads from opponents (see
   process advantage #2); what's not to like? Sure, nobody would be a
   politician today without a high tolerance for these problems, but even for
   politicians, negative ads and the fundraising treadmill have gotten out of
   hand.
   3. SODA *reduces the threat from unserious candidates*. Under plurality,
   an even an unqualified candidate can be a spoiler. Under Condorcet or
   Approval, they can prosper simply because of second-choice support from two
   polarized camps. In fact, in the latter case, candidates can do *better*
    the *less* voters know about them! If there's anything that annoys a
   serious politician, it's losing to an unqualified cipher. SODA has no such
   problem, unless one of the candidates with more first-choice votes puts
   their reputation on the line by explicitly choosing the centrist twice (in
   order to avoid something worse). That's not going to happen for an unknown.


[edit<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/index.php?title=Simple_Optionally-Delegated_Approval&action=edit&section=22>
]Compatibility with the US electoral college

A state could adopt SODA for assigning its electors in the electoral
college. If the state did not wish to dilute its voting power, it could
adopt SODA, conditional on a certain number of total electoral votes being
assigned in a non-winner-take-all fashion.

The way to do this would be to use a divisor-based Proportional
Representation process to assign electors between delegated votes for each
of the candidates and "undelegated approval electors".

Each candidate's electors would be sworn to vote as directed by that
candidate (not necessarily for that candidate), if consistent with that
candidate's pre-approvals.

Each "undelegated approval elector" would know the statewide non-delegated
approval total, and the total of number of affiliated electors throughout
the EC, for each candidate. Other "approval electors" would count as
fractionally affiliated based on their known approval totals. These electors
would be sworn to vote for whichever of the two candidates with the most
nationwide electors had the highest statewide undelegated approval total.
They would be chosen by the candidate for whom they were sworn to vote.
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