[EM] Election-Methods Digest, Vol 76, Issue 7

[Kevin Venzke]

Hi,

--- En date de : Mar 19.10.10, fsimmons at pcc.edu <fsimmons at pcc.edu> a écrit :
> Thanks for the clarification,
> Kristopher.
> 
> Also, if I remember correctly, we have another kind of
> monotonicity that is
> really a weak form of Participation, namely "mono add
> plump,"  which means that
> if a new ballot is added that "bullet votes" for candidate
> A, then A's
> probability of winning should not decrease.

It seems to me that the monotonicity criteria are about preserving the
status of some candidate given some transformation, while Participation
is focused on the *voter*.

So if we weaken Participation so that it is focused on one candidate,
we will be more likely to think of it as monotonicity-related. Besides
Mono-add-plump there's also Mono-add-top. Mono-remove-bottom probably
fits too...

> It seems to me that this milder form of participation
> should be attainable.

Yes, it's easy to satisfy, but quite weak as a guarantee.

It seems to get violated mostly by methods that use artificial majority
rules, so that a candidate's victory may depend on a majority contest
that didn't involve him.

Kevin