[EM] My Favorite Deterministic Condorcet Efficient Method: TACC

fsimmons at pcc.edu fsimmons at pcc.edu
Sat Nov 13 12:40:37 PST 2010



----- Original Message -----
From: "C.Benham" 
Date: Saturday, November 13, 2010 11:20 am
Subject: My Favorite Deterministic Condorcet Efficient Method: TACC
To: em 
Cc: Forest W Simmons 

> Regarding my example
> 
> 31: A>B
> 32: B>C
> 37: C>A
> 
> Forest:
> >
> > >I've come around to the belief that most Condorcet cycles in
> > ordinary elections
> > >are artificial, so chances are that this cycle was created from
> > the burial of B
> > >by the C faction. Giving C the win only rewards this manipulation.
> >
> >

[big snip]

> It is nothing like a sufficient counter to my original central 
> point, 
> that on the ballots as voted C is the strongest
> candidate and solidly dominates the TACC winner A.
> 
> Interpreting the ballots as 3-slot ratings, C has the highest 
> Approval 
> score and the the highest Top-Ratings
> score. And C pairwise beats A

I agree that if the ballots as voted are assumed to be sincere, then C has a better case than A.  And, of 
course, C can say, "We have to give them the benefit of a doubt that they are sincere."

I've just become more and more skeptical about Condorcet cycles being sincere. If my skepticism is 
justified, then, given a choice, I would rather have a method that prevents artificial cycles than a method 
that takes them seriously.  If the method prevents them, then how it would deal with them becomes 
completely moot.

Of course it would be nice to have a method that assumes sincerity and makes artificial cycles back-
fire, like Mr. Magoo coming out smelling like a rose while oblivious to all of the danger he has survived.

I am willing to admit that my skepticism could be misguided.  I would just like to see some evidence of 
that.  Kris M. makes a valid point; since all of our current methods in use tend to polarize the electorate, 
we any current cycles would be artificial, but once a Range or Condorcet method is adopted, this could 
change.

I'm not a die hard Condorcet supporter. In fact my truly favorite methods are neither Condorcet efficient 
nor deterministic; hence the title of this thread is intended to connote a deliberate restriction of attention 
to lesser evil methods that might be acceptable to Condorcet enthusiasts.  So far most Condorcet 
supporters seem to think that we have to have cycles, and therefore.the important thing is how to deal 
with them rather than how to prevent them.




More information about the Election-Methods mailing list