[EM] My Favorite Deterministic Condorcet Efficient Method: TACC

[C.Benham]

Forest wrote (13 Nov. 2010):
<snip>

> I'm not a die hard Condorcet supporter. In fact my truly favorite 
> methods are neither Condorcet efficient
> nor deterministic; hence the title of this thread is intended to 
> connote a deliberate restriction of attention
> to lesser evil methods that might be acceptable to Condorcet 
> enthusiasts.  So far most Condorcet
> supporters seem to think that we have to have cycles, and 
> therefore.the important thing is how to deal
> with them rather than how to prevent them.
>

Nor am I a die-hard Condoret supporter, but I'm intolerant of methods 
that aren't deterministic.

I have sympathy for the philosophical view that the winner must come 
from the Smith or Schwartz set.,
but not for the view that there aren't other desirable "representative" 
criteria regarding which member
of that set we elect.

25: A>B
06: A>C
32: B>C
27: C>A
10: C

TACC's election of  A here is unacceptably silly because C is so 
dominant over A.

I consider not electing C here somewhat embarrassing, but I have 
defended a couple
of methods that elect B: IRV and  Smith,IRV.

But IRV is completely invulnerable to Burial strategy, and Smith,IRV  is 
a Condorcet method
that keeps some of that IRV quality: Mutual Dominant Third candidates 
are invulnerable to
Burial.

In the example above we can see that C could be a sincere DMT candidate 
that has been
successfully buried by the 25 A>B voters (sincere may be A or A>C)  in TACC.

I think that  if for the sake of  defensive strategy  and/or higher 
Social Utility we encourage voters to
truncate, then it is better to dump the Condorcet criterion in favour 
of  the Favourite Betrayal criterion
(while "making do" with other representative criteria compliances.)

So I certainly prefer IBIFA (my favourite FBC method) to TACC and 
Winning Votes and Margins.

Chris Benham