[EM] Re : TACC (KM, CB)

[Kevin Venzke]

Hi Chris,

--- En date de : Ven 12.11.10, C.Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au> a écrit :
> Chris wrote:
> 
> BTW, I also like the version of Smith//Approval that allows
> voters to indicate an
> approval threshold so they can rank among unapproved
> candidates.
> 
> 
> Kevin responded (10 Nov 2010):
> 
> > I still don't. I don't understand why you should be
> allowed to vote
> > nonsense rankings and not have to stand by them when
> you succeed in
> > creating an artificial cycle. It means burial strategy
> only backfires when
> > the pawn candidate becomes the CW, which basically
> means burial is safe
> > as long as only one faction is doing it.
> 
> I think it's arguable that encouraging truncation goes
> against the spirit of the Condorcet criterion,
> and I hate random-fill incentives.

So, you don't like the implicit version. That's fine.

I have no inherent problem with Condorcet methods on threshold ballots.
There has just got to be a better-designed option than Smith//Approval.

> I just think that the
> winner of  Smith//Approval (threshold) can
> never be too bad  (SU-wise) or silly.

I gathered that, yes. I do wonder how fishing through disapproving 
rankings will aid SU.

> Arguing against results arising from "nonsense rankings" to
> me is almost an implicit criticism of
> the Condorcet criterion itself.

I'm talking about burial and by "nonsense" I mean "insincere." I don't
dispute that people can have sentiments below their approval threshold.
I'm saying the two phases of the method are too divorced from each other
to provide the incentive to vote those sentiments accurately. If you can
get it to the second phase (which *never* means sacrificing a win on the
first phase) it no longer matters what you did to get there.

This is one of those methods where the speculation that nobody will ever
try burial, is exactly what makes it a safe and useful option. If you
trust that your guy is going to pairwise beat some weak candidate, you
should bury the worse frontrunner, period. You can't lose and you might
gain. On the other hand, if you think the sincerity in the voting is going
to be so screwed up that your favorite frontrunner might not defeat the
weak candidate, *then* you want to make sure the latter candidate is
being beat by somebody, whatever you can do to stay in the Smith set.

Kevin