[EM] TACC (KM, CB)

C.Benham cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au
Fri Nov 12 16:55:29 PST 2010


Chris wrote:

BTW, I also like the version of Smith//Approval that allows voters to indicate an
approval threshold so they can rank among unapproved candidates.


Kevin responded (10 Nov 2010):

> I still don't. I don't understand why you should be allowed to vote
> nonsense rankings and not have to stand by them when you succeed in
> creating an artificial cycle. It means burial strategy only backfires when
> the pawn candidate becomes the CW, which basically means burial is safe
> as long as only one faction is doing it.



I think it's arguable that encouraging truncation goes against the 
spirit of the Condorcet criterion,
and I hate random-fill incentives. I just think that the winner of  
Smith//Approval (threshold) can
never be too bad  (SU-wise) or silly.

Arguing against results arising from "nonsense rankings" to me is almost 
an implicit criticism of
the Condorcet criterion itself.

Chris Benham



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