[EM] Re : TACC (KM, CB)

[C.Benham]

Kevin wrote:

> > I think it's arguable that encouraging truncation goes
> > against the spirit of the Condorcet criterion,
> > and I hate random-fill incentives.
>
> So, you don't like the implicit version. That's fine.


I like (and endorse) them both. I prefer them both to Winning Votes.

> I have no inherent problem with Condorcet methods on threshold ballots.
> There has just got to be a better-designed option than Smith//Approval.


I gave a lot of thought to this a few years ago. I reject anything that 
fails the
"Definite Majority" criterion.  I just think the alternatives to 
Smith//Approval
(on threshold ballots) are in general too complicated and too hard to 
justify.

My alternative favourite in this group (which used to be my favourite) is
"Approval-Sorted Margins":

http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Approval_Sorted_Margins

> First "seed" the list in approval order. Then while any alternative X 
> pairwise defeats the
> alternative Y immediately above it in the list, find the X and Y of 
> this type that have the
> least difference D in approval, and modify the list by swapping X and Y. 


Kevin wrote:

> I do wonder how fishing through disapproving rankings will aid SU. 

It may not, but it won't stifle voters from expressing all their sincere 
rankings so as not to
conceal any "sincere CW" (regarded by many as in principle the best 
winner no-matter-what).


Chris Benham