[EM] IRV ballot pile count (proof of closed form)

[Jameson Quinn]

2010/2/10 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <abd at lomaxdesign.com>

> At 02:16 PM 2/10/2010, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>
>  What if the bribe is payable only after the vote, and only for effective
>> votes? (And don't say that the bribegiver can't be trusted. Since corruption
>> is often a very cheap investment for the bribegiver, they would not be
>> particularly motivated to fail to pay the bribe after the fact. Even if
>> trust was lacking, human ingenuity can easily come up with ways of securing
>> the deal.)
>>
>
> The real issue is whether or not it would be easier to corrupt a delegable
> proxy system than others.
>

Although you make a number of other, speculative arguments for why DP should
be objectively difficult to corrupt, this is by far your strongest point.
Even if DP is corruptible - an idea which, despite your arguments, I still
find plausible - I see no reason why it should be more corruptible than any
present-day system, or than any other proposed system. Any anti-corruption
safeguards could be made to work as well or, in some cases, better under DP
than with other systems. Thus, corruptibility is not really a valid argument
against DP.

(In other words... quit while you're ahead. If you have one good argument,
you don't need 3.)

Jameson Quinn
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