[EM] IRV ballot pile count (proof of closed form)

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 02:16 PM 2/10/2010, Jameson Quinn wrote:

>What if the bribe is payable only after the vote, and only for 
>effective votes? (And don't say that the bribegiver can't be 
>trusted. Since corruption is often a very cheap investment for the 
>bribegiver, they would not be particularly motivated to fail to pay 
>the bribe after the fact. Even if trust was lacking, human ingenuity 
>can easily come up with ways of securing the deal.)

The real issue is whether or not it would be easier to corrupt a 
delegable proxy system than others.

Question about a "payment for effective votes"? Do you mean an actual 
decision that favors the bribegiver, or merely that the bribegiver 
does his best, as far as the bribegiver sees? Now, if I were doing 
something illegal, like accepting a bribe, I'd have no trust in being 
able to enforce an agreement. I've never heard of a bribe being 
payment on results; in addition, I might corrupt myself, place all my 
relationships at risk, and then, because the arguments for this 
proposal were bad, it doesn't pass. That my own clients might also 
"betray" my vote and open argument is only part of this.

If I don't tell my clients and I argue stupid arguments to them, then 
I risk my entire relationship with them. It better be a lot of money!

Remember, I'm not suggesting DP for government, per se. The political 
applications would be for organizations that advise voters. So what a 
bribe would be accomplishing is that I'd give bad advice to voters. 
In a DP system, this really means "to my friends."

That's sociopathic. Now, how many sociopaths are going to be highly 
trusted, in a system that depends on frequent personal contact (not 
the abstract persona and image that play in present politics)? And 
the trust runs in both directions.

If a proxy has weak connections with clients, say, lots of clients, 
they will not be as solidly advised, they may take it or leave it. 
They won't donate money to a suggested cause, they won't necessarily 
bother to vote.

>Consider the common types of corruption at the moment. The two most 
>common are non-quid-pro-quo support for the candidate who, of 
>themselves, are more amenable to one's position, unless both are on 
>one's side (this is corrupt if the issue is "under the radar" for 
>most voters, as it tends to winnow opposition down to nothing over 
>time, even if the majority of the electorate opposes you); and 
>allowing lobbyists essentially free hand in writing the "fine print" 
>of laws (again, the point is that the average voter will not know or 
>care enough about the effects of this to make a difference). If the 
>majority - even an overwhelming majority - does not care enough to 
>vote directly, then it can be perfectly effective to corrupt the 
>judgement of a key representative.

That's right. That's how corruption works. Rather than spend money to 
serve the public more effectively to win contracts, spend money to 
influence a corrupt award. It only makes sense if there is some 
fulcrum, some point of serious excess power.

You are incorrect about one thing. It's not necessary for the 
majority to vote on most things. In an Asset system, most people, the 
vast majority, would vote once every election cycle, for a 
representative. It's possible that there may be different reps: to 
neighborhood, to city, to county, to state. Those who are more 
interested will offer to serve as electors and register as 
candidates. These become public voters and will be far more motivated 
than your average citizen, and probably substantially more 
knowledgeable, on average. Anyone can do it, in the systems I 
envision, but getting other people, enough to make it worth the 
continued effort, isn't so easy. Still, none of it is lost, the votes 
aren't wasted. You just pass it on, and, in a direct/Asset rep 
system, you can either forget about it -- which then makes your rep 
like a present rep -- or you can watch -- or you can watch closely 
only when there is an issue you have some particular interest in.

And when you have something to say about it, you know exactly whom 
you can go to, *your representative*. The one you gave your votes to. 
You will be recieved, I expect, with more genuine cordiality than we 
are accustomed to from our representatives. Remember, you freely 
picked this person as the one you most trust to pass on your votes 
to. (If this person also passed your vote on, that merely gives you 
*two* people to go to.)

To me, Asset Voting is not merely an election method, it is a device 
for increasing involvement in government, for making the connection 
between the people and government very real, tangible, visible, as 
well as fair.

We are so far from this that it's hard for most of us to imagine. 
*OUR government.*

I've been in a small town where it was like that. Town Meeting 
government, in fact. Sure, there were elected officials, but the town 
was actually run by the people, and it felt like that. Positions were 
volunteer except for expenses. Government was open, whenever anything 
was controversial, they held meetings to talk about it, often 
scheduling several of them so that people who could not come one time 
could come another.

Scale was small, that's why it worked. Now, how could this kind of 
involvement become scalable, so people can contribute what they feel 
they can afford in time, and it isn't wasted, when the scale is much larger?