[EM] A Comparison of the Two Known Monotone, Clone Free Methods for Electing Uncovered Alternatives

fsimmons at pcc.edu fsimmons at pcc.edu
Fri Dec 3 11:53:34 PST 2010

Yes, that's DMC, just bubble sort the approval order. So the DMC winner is the
lowest approval candidate that pairwise beats every candidate with more approval.

----- Original Message -----
From: Jameson Quinn

> OK, so what's DMC? Feel free to link to an electowiki
> description or old
> post, you don't have to rewrite the description.
> Or... well, I guess I can figure it out - it's approval bubble-
> sorted by
> pairwise. And it's apparently monotone and clone-free, but not
> uncovered. So
> if the approval order is A>B but B is the pairwise champion
> (CW), then a
> "caricature of B", B', who beats B but loses to A, can stop B
> from winning
> DMC, but will not stop them in DMC/Covering Chain. Am I right?

That's the idea.

> Still, I think that DMC is "good enough" in practical terms; I
> don't think
> that the (debatable) benefits of the other methods are worth the extra
> complication. "The most-approved candidate who could beat all
> more-approved
> candidates" is actually pretty easy to understand.
> JQ
> 2010/12/2
> > My Bad.
> >
> > I meant DMC (democratic majority choice) not MCA. That's what
> I get for
> > making
> > up names for the sole purpose of making a method sound attractive!
> >

More information about the Election-Methods mailing list