[EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections

[Jameson Quinn]

2010/4/29 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <abd at lomaxdesign.com>

> At 01:07 PM 4/29/2010, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>
>  One device that is used by Borda Count, which is a related method, is to
>> have as many ranks as candidates. While I generally favor this (it allows
>> voters to use their ability to compare preferences to generate a rank
>> order), it may be collecting noise, if there are a lot of candidates. My
>> sense is that 3-rank Bucklin (which means 3 approved ranks), with an added
>> rank within the disapproved set, is enough for most purposes, but some
>> studies should be done with simulations to determine how much results are
>> improved with additional ranks.
>>
>>
>> 1. I don't see how Borda is "related" to Bucklin.
>>
>
> Borda is Range Voting with a special restriction: equal ranking is not
> allowed, and the number of ranks is equal to the number of candidates.
> Strictly, real Borda rules do allow equal ranking, but only at the bottom,
> and the voter is essentially penalized with a weak vote.
>
> Another way to put it is that Borda with equal ranking allowed and
> therefore empty ranks is Range. Thus we can recognize that the Borda count
> that is promoted by Saari is simply Range with the hands of the voters tied.
>
> And the ballot that feeds Bucklin is strategically optimal if it is a Range
> ballot covering the approved set. That's the connection.
>
>
One could probably construct such a connection for any two systems. I know
that you feel in your heart that this connection has a deep truth, whereas
some concoction of why Schulze and Plurality are deeply connected would be
bullshit, but it's hard to see that you could convince a mathematically
openminded person who disagreed with you.

Mr. Quinn seems to have a common response: that "strategic" voting is Bad.
> He doesn't say what he means by it, but Bucklin voters were allowed to leave
> a rank empty. So if they had a strong preference for their favorite, but
> were still willing to accept, in the end, the election of another candidate,
> they could rank their favorite in first rank and the other in third rank,
> which represents a sincere -- but smart -- vote. It reduces the chance,
> which does exist with Bucklin, that a multiple majority would be found in
> the second round, and that thus they'd be possibly abstaining from that
> election, having voted for both of these candidates.
>
> Note that this outcome isn't a bad one.... if it were actually bad, the
> voters wouldn't have added the additional approval, I assume. In a two-round
> system, they gain additional flexibility, they can postpone the "hold my
> nose" vote till the end, when it is far more obvious that it's a necessity.
> They will have some pretty good information from the primary.
>

I don't think that strategic voting itself is Bad. I think that an
opportunity for strategy is an opportunity for regret, and regret (and
recrimination) is something that makes you want to change voting systems so
they don't give the "unfair" result you regret helping to cause.

(Of course, I don't mean a result you regret; any system has losers. I mean,
actions you regret; a result that you realize you could easily have
changed.)

This is why semi-honest (Range-type) strategy is in some ways more
pernicious than dishonest strategy. Any time a semi-honest strategy could
have changed the result, people will probably feel more regret than if the
same change had been possible with an honest strategy.

I could write pages about other things I think about strategy, but that's
enough for now.

Jameson
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