[EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections

[Peter Zbornik]

Hi,

I would prefer to have the P. elected by the same people electing the board.
The P. is indeed the person most often representing the party on the
outside.

Peter

On Tue, Apr 27, 2010 at 4:02 AM, Jonathan Lundell <jlundell at pobox.com>wrote:

>  On Apr 26, 2010, at 5:54 PM, Juho wrote:
>
> > On Apr 27, 2010, at 3:22 AM, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
> >
> >> On Apr 26, 2010, at 5:18 PM, Juho wrote:
> >>
> >>> On Apr 27, 2010, at 3:01 AM, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
> >>>
> >>>> On Apr 26, 2010, at 4:45 PM, Juho wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>> Draft of a method:
> >>>>>
> >>>>> - collect ranked votes
> >>>>> - use Condorcet to determine P (Condorcet tends to elect a compromise
> candidate that all voters find reasonably good)
> >>>>> - use STV (using the same ballots) to elect the group of P and VPs
> (some special rules are needed to guarantee that the already named P will
> not be eliminated in the process but will be elected)
> >>>>> - use STV (using the same ballots) to elect members of the board
> (some special rules are needed to guarantee that the already named P and VPs
> will not be eliminated in the process but will be elected)
> >>>>>
> >>>>> One could elect P and VPs also later. In that case one could elect
> them from the members of the (already existing) board. Otherwise the process
> would be similar.
> >>>>
> >>>> This is a better approach, I think. Protecting already-elected members
> and preserving proportionality is a subtle problem, and I don't think
> there's a completely satisfactory solution available. It's defensible for
> filling vacancies (below), but when it can be avoided, it should be. (Unless
> someone has a great idea for this kind of countback.)
> >>>>
> >>>> A burial strategy for P would have unfortunate effects for the STV
> election, is a possible problem.
> >>>
> >>> The STV election that follows may also reduce the incentives to try the
> burial strategy. That is because (in addition to burial not being a very
> efficient strategy in the first place) the benefit would be only to get a
> better P but not more voting power in the board, and because the modified
> vote could well contribute to the benefit of the competing sections in the
> proportional election.
> >>
> >> It's a reasonable argument (though the STV election should go first), if
> the voters are reasonable and if they regard the P office as less important
> than the makeup of the board--that depends on how the office is defined, I
> suppose.
> >>
> >> Another alternative would be to hold a separate P election (new ballots)
> once the board is defined. Or to let the board elect the officers from
> amongst themselves. That appeals to me, actually, again depending on the
> definition of the roles.
> >
> > A fully separate P election would make the board less proportional -
> unless the elected P would have voting power only if he/she is already a
> member of the board.
>
> That wasn't my suggestion. Rather, one would hold an STV board election,
> and then elect P from the proportionally elected board. Depending on the
> role of P, the voters for P would be the at-large membership or the board
> itself (the latter makes sense if P/VP is largely an internal role, as
> opposed to an external independent executive).
>  ----
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>
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