[EM] How to fix the flawed "Nash equilibrium" concept for voting-theory purposes

[Jameson Quinn]

>
> For my part, I argue that Nash can *never* be applied within the
> context of voting.  The reality as evidenced by the empirical data (in
> vivo) invalidates the basic assumptions of Nash.  Individual voters
> are *not* attempting to affect the outcome of elections.  As this
> reality contradicts Nash, we cannot turn around and look back at it
> through the lenses of Nash.
>
>
I agree with your premises, but not your conclusions. Voters are not
purposive-rational, it's true. But that doesn't invalidate the conclusions
of a Nash analysis, it just makes them tentative. Voters DO think of
themselves as being purposive, even when they clearly aren't. Thus,
trembling-hand Nash may still be a useful source of well-defined hypotheses
about voter behaviour - hypotheses which would then need to be tested
empirically.

JQ
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