[EM] How to fix the flawed "Nash equilibrium" concept for voting-theory purposes

[Michael Allan]

> > 1. Current voting methods lack the Nash-redeeming addition.  In a
> >    typical election, no individual vote has any effect on the
> >    result.  The effect is exactly zero.
> > 
> >  2. Voters nevertheless turn out in large numbers.
> > 
> > It follows that the individual voter is *not* attempting to affect
> > the results.
 
Warren Smith wrote:

> The idea of the Nash fix was not as an actual proposed modification
> and "improvement" to a voting system... It was instead to make the
> Nash MODEL of strategic behavior within that voting system, and the
> Nash CONCLUSIONS ... be more realistic and useful...  This agrees
> with Allan, I guess.

I think it misses the main point.  For your part, you and Raph hope to
apply Nash's model within the context of voting.  You therefore tweak
that context in vitro by adding a little indeterminacy, such that Nash
can grapple with it for analytical purposes.  Alternatively, you look
at adding indeterminacy to Nash itself (trembling hand).  This much I
understand (roughly).

For my part, I argue that Nash can *never* be applied within the
context of voting.  The reality as evidenced by the empirical data (in
vivo) invalidates the basic assumptions of Nash.  Individual voters
are *not* attempting to affect the outcome of elections.  As this
reality contradicts Nash, we cannot turn around and look back at it
through the lenses of Nash.

More generally (I argue) purposive-rational models of ego-centric
behaviour are unlikely to be made serviceable for voting theory.  We
ought therefore to investigate the real reasons for voting (separate
thread "Why do voters vote?") with an eye to improving our methods,
facilities, etc.  This conclusion seems inescapable.

Or am I wrong?
-- 
Michael Allan

Toronto, +1 647-436-4521
http://zelea.com/