[EM] Condorcet How?

[Dave Ketchum]

On Apr 8, 2010, at 8:03 PM, Kevin Venzke wrote:

> Hi Juho,
>
> --- En date de : Jeu 8.4.10, Juho <juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk> a écrit :
>>> I more or less despise the election of A in this
>> scenario:
>>>
>>> 49 A
>>> 24 B
>>> 27 C>B
>>>
>>> I believe the possibility of this outcome is a
>> disincentive for a candidate
>>> like C to run.

There are often vote counts near the edge of some rule applying that  
can please/annoy some.  IRV is much more able to offer annoying results.

Here a couple less votes for A, or a couple more for B, would have  
made a change.

The many B, combined with a high C>B count,  is suspect - more like a  
construction for a debate than a believable election count.
>
>>
>> The story behind these votes seems to be that C is
>> ideologically close to B and its nomination makes A win
>> instead of B. If C is ideologically close to B why don't the
>> "B" voters vote "B>C" (and make C win)?
>
> Because the story is that C is not considered an established candidate
> (or a frontrunner), and the B voters (if they actually prefer C, which
> is not something I mean to suggest) will not condescend to rank C.
> Depending on the method, they could hand the election to C by  
> ranking C,
> and/or alternatively compel C supporters to not vote sincerely.
>
> The best scenario is for C to be able to run, be voted for  
> sincerely, and
> either win, or not affect the outcome at all.

Again, counts near an edge can please or annoy.  Supporting the  
scenario you describe could result in some other problems.
>
>> If C is
>> ideologically far from B then most "B" voters may vote as
>> they do now, but then maybe "A" voters should vote "A>B"
>> (and make B win) (since C seems to be closer to B than A).
>> It is hard to find an explanation to sincere votes like
>> this. Or are these maybe strategic votes, e.g. so that
>> sincere "A>B" voters have decided to vote "A"?
>
> The A voters will not vote A>B because A and B are considered the
> frontrunners. (i.e. that is the scenario that concerns me.)

It makes sense for A and B to be enemies.  The B/C pattern is the one  
that is suspect.
>
>
>>> Fundamentally, if I said only one thing: I don't
>> believe that the margins
>>> ranking of defeat strength (resulting from its
>> treatment of unranked
>>> candidates) is in agreement with what voters would
>> expect and want.
>>
>> What would you consider to be a better approach than
>> margins for sincere votes? (winning votes has also scenarios
>> that may be questioned)
>
> Maybe Range? I guess I don't see that question as interesting or  
> useful.
>
>> (Note btw that in another mail I just mentioned also the
>> possibility of allowing B and C to formally team up so that
>> defeats within their team would not be considered as severe
>> as defeats between A and the team.)
>
> This doesn't interest me much (same as Forest's suggestion of pre-
> election agreements in DYN) because I'm not interested in the case  
> that
> a single party (for all practical purposes) nominates two candidates.
> I don't think that will normally happen or be desirable under any
> method. What I'm concerned with is the viability of a "third" option  
> and
> voting for the third option.

Having third parties gives additional opportunity for clones - better  
to learn to minimize the damage clones can cause.

It is the ability to vote for more than one, and have difference in  
liking be expressible, that puts methods such as Score and Condorcet  
ahead of Plurality.  While we can talk of making them better, they  
start as an improvement.

Dave Ketchum
>
> Kevin Venzke