[EM] Condorcet How?

[Kevin Venzke]

Hi Juho,

--- En date de : Jeu 8.4.10, Juho <juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk> a écrit :
> > I more or less despise the election of A in this
> scenario:
> > 
> > 49 A
> > 24 B
> > 27 C>B
> > 
> > I believe the possibility of this outcome is a
> disincentive for a candidate
> > like C to run.
> 
> The story behind these votes seems to be that C is
> ideologically close to B and its nomination makes A win
> instead of B. If C is ideologically close to B why don't the
> "B" voters vote "B>C" (and make C win)?

Because the story is that C is not considered an established candidate 
(or a frontrunner), and the B voters (if they actually prefer C, which 
is not something I mean to suggest) will not condescend to rank C. 
Depending on the method, they could hand the election to C by ranking C,
and/or alternatively compel C supporters to not vote sincerely.

The best scenario is for C to be able to run, be voted for sincerely, and
either win, or not affect the outcome at all.

> If C is
> ideologically far from B then most "B" voters may vote as
> they do now, but then maybe "A" voters should vote "A>B"
> (and make B win) (since C seems to be closer to B than A).
> It is hard to find an explanation to sincere votes like
> this. Or are these maybe strategic votes, e.g. so that
> sincere "A>B" voters have decided to vote "A"?

The A voters will not vote A>B because A and B are considered the
frontrunners. (i.e. that is the scenario that concerns me.)

> > Fundamentally, if I said only one thing: I don't
> believe that the margins
> > ranking of defeat strength (resulting from its
> treatment of unranked
> > candidates) is in agreement with what voters would
> expect and want.
> 
> What would you consider to be a better approach than
> margins for sincere votes? (winning votes has also scenarios
> that may be questioned)

Maybe Range? I guess I don't see that question as interesting or useful.

> (Note btw that in another mail I just mentioned also the
> possibility of allowing B and C to formally team up so that
> defeats within their team would not be considered as severe
> as defeats between A and the team.)

This doesn't interest me much (same as Forest's suggestion of pre-
election agreements in DYN) because I'm not interested in the case that
a single party (for all practical purposes) nominates two candidates.
I don't think that will normally happen or be desirable under any 
method. What I'm concerned with is the viability of a "third" option and
voting for the third option.

Kevin Venzke