[EM] Condorcet How?

[Juho]

On Apr 8, 2010, at 11:00 PM, Kevin Venzke wrote:

> I more or less despise the election of A in this scenario:
>
> 49 A
> 24 B
> 27 C>B
>
> I believe the possibility of this outcome is a disincentive for a  
> candidate
> like C to run.

The story behind these votes seems to be that C is ideologically close  
to B and its nomination makes A win instead of B. If C is  
ideologically close to B why don't the "B" voters vote "B>C" (and make  
C win)? If C is ideologically far from B then most "B" voters may vote  
as they do now, but then maybe "A" voters should vote "A>B" (and make  
B win) (since C seems to be closer to B than A). It is hard to find an  
explanation to sincere votes like this. Or are these maybe strategic  
votes, e.g. so that sincere "A>B" voters have decided to vote "A"?

> Fundamentally, if I said only one thing: I don't believe that the  
> margins
> ranking of defeat strength (resulting from its treatment of unranked
> candidates) is in agreement with what voters would expect and want.

What would you consider to be a better approach than margins for  
sincere votes? (winning votes has also scenarios that may be questioned)

(Note btw that in another mail I just mentioned also the possibility  
of allowing B and C to formally team up so that defeats within their  
team would not be considered as severe as defeats between A and the  
team.)

Juho