[EM] Condorcet How?
Kevin Venzke
stepjak at yahoo.fr
Thu Apr 8 13:00:48 PDT 2010
Hi,
--- En date de : Jeu 8.4.10, robert bristow-johnson <rbj at audioimagination.com> a écrit :
> Juho just explained it, so now i know (earlier i had
> wondered if "margins" was a normalized or percentage beat
> strength). i've always thought that the Tideman RP was
> *only* framed in terms of margins. i do not know why
> anyone would back the "winning votes" metric for beat
> strength.
I would say this is more common than not in the history of this list.
There are arguments dealing with strategic incentives, and risk of
disaster. (There is on the other side the argument that margins allows
full ranking while WV encourages truncation, but I think when voters
actually do (full-rank) they will find themselves playing chicken
in how each side ranks the main opposition.)
Using margins fails Plurality (example: 7 A>B, 5 B, 8 C elects A
instead of B). Plurality basically says that A can't possibly be a
better alternative than C.
I more or less despise the election of A in this scenario:
49 A
24 B
27 C>B
I believe the possibility of this outcome is a disincentive for a candidate
like C to run.
Fundamentally, if I said only one thing: I don't believe that the margins
ranking of defeat strength (resulting from its treatment of unranked
candidates) is in agreement with what voters would expect and want.
Kevin Venzke
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