[EM] Condorcet How?

[Kevin Venzke]

Hi Dave,

--- En date de : Jeu 8.4.10, Dave Ketchum <davek at clarityconnect.com> a écrit :
> > --- En date de : Jeu 8.4.10, Juho <juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk>
> a écrit :
> >>> I more or less despise the election of A in
> this
> >> scenario:
> >>> 
> >>> 49 A
> >>> 24 B
> >>> 27 C>B
> >>> 
> >>> I believe the possibility of this outcome is
> a
> >> disincentive for a candidate
> >>> like C to run.
> 
> There are often vote counts near the edge of some rule
> applying that can please/annoy some.  IRV is much more
> able to offer annoying results.

I'm not comparing to IRV. But I use the same scenario to show why I don't
like IRV as I do for margins.

> Here a couple less votes for A, or a couple more for B,
> would have made a change.

Yes, but I don't know what difference that makes. Voters who want to vote
for C do not know what the totals will be. They'll have to take a risk,
and I don't think it's necessary to make them have that risk. If the C
voters accidentally give the election to A, simply by voting sincerely
for their favorite candidate, it will be no consolation that it *almost*
didn't happen that way.

> The many B, combined with a high C>B count,  is
> suspect - more like a construction for a debate than a
> believable election count.

You can change 19 of the 24 B votes into B>C votes with the same result.
That would make B and C almost clones.

> >> The story behind these votes seems to be that C
> is
> >> ideologically close to B and its nomination makes
> A win
> >> instead of B. If C is ideologically close to B why
> don't the
> >> "B" voters vote "B>C" (and make C win)?
> > 
> > Because the story is that C is not considered an
> established candidate
> > (or a frontrunner), and the B voters (if they actually
> prefer C, which
> > is not something I mean to suggest) will not
> condescend to rank C.
> > Depending on the method, they could hand the election
> to C by ranking C,
> > and/or alternatively compel C supporters to not vote
> sincerely.
> > 
> > The best scenario is for C to be able to run, be voted
> for sincerely, and
> > either win, or not affect the outcome at all.
> 
> Again, counts near an edge can please or annoy. 

Being near an edge just means the result is close to being changed.
But my complaint has nothing to do with how the result is changed near
the edge. You can take it away from the edge if you want, by making A
weaker, but to me that makes the scenario look less realistic.

> Supporting the scenario you describe could result in some
> other problems.

If you want to advocate margins, then feel free, I won't stop you. But
"there could be problems" is not an argument.

> > This doesn't interest me much (same as Forest's
> suggestion of pre-
> > election agreements in DYN) because I'm not interested
> in the case that
> > a single party (for all practical purposes) nominates
> two candidates.
> > I don't think that will normally happen or be
> desirable under any
> > method. What I'm concerned with is the viability of a
> "third" option and
> > voting for the third option.
> 
> Having third parties gives additional opportunity for
> clones - better to learn to minimize the damage clones can
> cause.

I don't know what this means. In practice I don't believe that parties
will nominate clones, because it's inherently hazardous, even when the
method is clone-proof. That means it's better to worry about three-
candidate scenarios without clones.

Even if parties could harmlessly nominate clones, I don't think this
would be all that advantageous. It's not the kind of "additional choice"
I care about offering to voters. So I don't mind if a method does nothing
to facilitate it.

Kevin Venzke