[EM] New simple kind of party-based proportionality, avoiding deweighting, and using range-style ballots

Warren Smith warren.wds at gmail.com
Fri Oct 9 13:57:53 PDT 2009


Well, in the J.Quinn example, the 2 "independent" voters could equally
well be interpreted as trying to elect Al, but at the same time they
do not want A-party to have too much control of parliament.  This
often arises in parliamentary elections and is a conflict which has
nothing necessarily to do with the voting system, it has to do with
the nature of parliamentary government.  Under this interpretation you
could claim the voting system was doing the right thing.

But Quinn makes the larger point that by manipulating who was a member
of what party,
the candidates could aim to manipulate the election.  And I guess the
same point could be made about the party-list systems in use by many
countries right now. Quinn then
mutters about using correlations to cause a psuedo-party structure
without actually having parties, but I think that is a bad idea and it
too presumably could be manipulated.

In particular, with my scheme all candidates from a 51%-top-rated party could
each choose to be in their "own" party-of-one, and then they'd win
100% of the seats!

Oops.

A variant intended to overcome that objection is to demand the ratings ballots
be like in "Asset voting" instead of range voting -- that is, all the
scores are >=0 and SUM to 100.

A party's share then instead is the sum of all the votes its candidates receive.
Parties splitting up, or merging, will not work to increase their share.



-- 
Warren D. Smith
http://RangeVoting.org  <-- add your endorsement (by clicking
"endorse" as 1st step)
and
math.temple.edu/~wds/homepage/works.html



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