[EM] New simple kind of party-based proportionality, avoiding deweighting, and using range-style ballots

[Warren Smith]

On 10/9/09, Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com> wrote:
> I like the concept...
> However, consider the following honest preferences:
> Candidates
> Party A: Alice and Al; party B, Berenice
>
> Voters:
> 5 A voters: Alice 100, Al 40, Berenice 0
> 2 independent voters: Alice 0, Al 100, Berenice 90
> 3 B voters: Alice 0, Al 10, Berenice 100
>
> Totals: Alice 500, Al 430, Berenice 480. Party averages: A 465, B 480.
> Winners, Al and Berenice ***
>
> So the independent voters would be best-served by dishonestly ranking Alice
> above Berenice, so as to give party A an extra slot and elect Al. In other
> words, you're forcing the straitjacket of party loyalty onto them.

--You probably have a genuine problem in mind here, but you screwed up
when trying to present your example.  You just said Al is elected,
then you said the Indpt voters
want to lie in order to elect Al. Huh?

Oh, I see, the real winners were Alice and Berenice; change the line I
adorned with *** to fix it.   Hmm, I'm not immediately sure what to
think of this.  I guess there are two kinds of mental goals a voter
could have: to elect certain candidates (or not), and to boost (or
not) certain parties.  The problem if any (?) is the voter sometimes
has to decide which.



-- 
Warren D. Smith
http://RangeVoting.org  <-- add your endorsement (by clicking
"endorse" as 1st step)
and
math.temple.edu/~wds/homepage/works.html