[EM] Anyone got a good analysis on limitations of approval andrange voting?

[Stéphane Rouillon]

Would this suggest it could be possible to overcome Arrow's theorem using range ballots?

I do not want to say Arrow's theorem is false. All I ask is:

Are prefential ballots one of the hypothesis used in Arrow's theorem proof?
 
> From: jlundell at pobox.com
> Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2009 11:43:10 -0600
> To: andru at cs.cornell.edu
> CC: election-methods at electorama.com
> Subject: Re: [EM] Anyone got a good analysis on limitations of approval andrange voting?
> 
> On Nov 16, 2009, at 10:53 AM, Andrew Myers wrote:
> 
> > Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> >> Notice that the requirement of Arrow that "social preferences be insensitive to variations in the intensity of preferences" was preposterous. Arrow apparently insisted on this because he believed that it was impossible to come up with any objective measure of preference intensity; however, that was simply his opinion and certainly isn't true where there is a cost to voting. 
> > Arrow doesn't impose that requirement; that's not what IIA says.
> 
> This is in part Arrow's justification for dealing only with ordinal (vs cardinal) preferences in the Possibility Theorem. Add may label it preposterous, but it's the widely accepted view. Mine as well.
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