[EM] strategy-free Condorcet method after all!

[Warren Smith]

Think some more re Jobst Heitzig's "Reverse Llull" method,
I think "strategy-free" is not the right phrase to describe it.

Why? Heitzig's recommended way to vote is totally strategic (!), i.e.
heavily dependent
on that voter's info about what all the other voters are doing.

By that reasoning, any strategic vote in ANY voting method is "honest"
provided the voter, when deciding on her strategic vote, is asked
(e.g. by her PC) a number of questions about both her preferences and
about her perceptions of the other voters, and she answers them all
honestly in order to generate the strategic vote!

Well, no.

But what Heitzig really does accomplish, is: he has a voting method
where voters, BY ACTING STRATEGICALLY, will elect the honest-voter
Condorcet winner (when one exists).

Now with ordinary approval and range voting, it is an already known theorem, see
http://rangevoting.org/AppCW.html
that voters, BY VOTING STRATEGICALLY, will always elect the honest-voter
Condorcet winner (when one exists).  It is assumed that
they choose their strategic vote in a certain (realistic) manner, and
they have enough information about the other voters to do so...  in
particular, they do not need to have perfect info about the other
votes, they merely need to know enough to know
who the Condorcet winner C, and who the approval-voting winner would
be if it were not C, are.

-- 
Warren D. Smith
http://RangeVoting.org  <-- add your endorsement (by clicking
"endorse" as 1st step)
and
math.temple.edu/~wds/homepage/works.html