[EM] Anyone got a good analysis on limitations of approval andrange voting? (long)

robert bristow-johnson rbj at audioimagination.com
Tue Nov 10 00:18:41 PST 2009


On Nov 9, 2009, at 11:48 PM, Matthew Welland wrote:

> Approval
> Does not meet the desire of some to be able to differentiate  
> between "I like", "I like a lot" etc. (note: this seems like  
> perfectionism to me. Large numbers of voters and opinions all over  
> the bell curve should make individual expression at the greater  
> level of granularity irrelevant.)

we should be able to express our preferences.  Approval reduces our  
metric of preference to a 1-bit number, a dichotomy.  i would like to  
have more bits in that number.

> Suite of complicated systems that strive to reach "Condorcet" ideals.
> No regular bloke would ever trust 'em because you can't explain how  
> they work in one or two sentences.

Round Robin tournament, Ranked Ballot:  The contestant who wins in a  
single match is the candidate who is preferred over the other in more  
ballots.  The candidate who is elected to office is the contestant  
who loses to no one in the round robin tournament.

that's two sentences and two labels.

> Technically superior to other systems.
> Not clear what problem with approval they would solve. Unless you  
> are a perfectionist and insist that individuals express nuances of  
> opinion...

like which candidate they like better than the other candidate?

> It was very tedious voting in any of the ranking systems.

it's tedious to decide who you like better?  who you would prefer if  
any two candidates are presented?

i will say this: even though it is prohibited in the present IRV that  
Burlington VT has, there is no reason that ties should not be allowed  
in any ranked ballot.

but i would agree it would be tedious to allocate preference points  
in Range.

> So, to re-frame my question. What is the fatal flaw with approval?

it's essentially like Plurality except you get to mark "X" on more  
than one candidate (like you do in multi-seat races).  i don't like  
it for multi-seat (in the state senate for the county i am in, all of  
our senators are elected from the county at large and there are 6 for  
my county) i always think i'm hurting a candidate i actively support  
by voting for another candidate from the same party that i approve  
of.  so then i mark "X" on only one candidate and, if enough people  
vote tactically like that, the election works like Plurality.  we  
want an improvement to Plurality because we might like a three or  
four party system (or 3 parties and viable independents).  we want to  
not have to consider the likelihood of wasting our vote by deciding  
who to Approve of.  we know we approve of the candidate we support,  
but it is a tactical decision to decide if you approve of a candidate  
you would normally approve of but is not the candidate that you have  
actively supported.

like what if you're a little old lady and you like and support you  
representative legislator for re-election.  and you support him over  
any likely candidate from the other party, and it might be close so  
you wanna feel like you helped him.  but your grandson that you  
cherish and are proud is running as an independent.  in fact you gave  
money to your grandson's campaign.  you support your grandson.  you  
don't know if he'll win or not, but you do not want to harm his  
chances.  you also don't want your good ol' incumbent you've always  
supported.  you want to make sure he doesn't lose to the other major  
party candidate.  but you wouldn't mind harming his chances if the  
race ended up between him and your grandson.

is that putting it in an accessible context?  so then with Approval  
voting, for sure this grandma marks "X" by her grandson's name.  but  
does she or doesn't she Approve her good ol' incumbent?  Approval  
doesn't let you mark it "Approve except in the race with my top choice."

> I'm not interested in subtle flaws that result in imperfect  
> results. I'm interested in flaws that result in big problems such  
> as those we see with plurality and IRV.

how 'bout electing the wrong candidate?

i mean isn't that the essential flaw?  e.g. the flaw with the  
Electoral College is that sometimes it elects the wrong candidate.   
it does pretty good when it selects the same winner as the popular  
vote, but when it disagrees with the popular vote it *never* creates  
more legitimacy or confidence in the election results.  so then why  
have it?  what good is it?  it's either ineffective in "filtering"  
the popular vote or, when it *is* effective it makes matters worse.   
such a useful device!

with Condorcet you elect the candidate that, from the set of voters  
who have an opinion, is preferred by a majority of that set over any  
other candidate that you pick.

any winner of an election system that elects a candidate who is not  
the Condercet winner, has elected someone whom was rejected by the  
voting majority in favor of the Condorcet winner who wasn't elected.   
how is that congruent to the principle of democracy?  do we have  
elections and explicitly give it to the candidate with the fewer  
votes?  i don't see such flaws as subtle.

--

r b-j                  rbj at audioimagination.com

"Imagination is more important than knowledge."







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