[EM] Anyone got a good analysis on limitations of approval and range voting?

[Kristofer Munsterhjelm]

Raph Frank wrote:
> On Sat, Nov 7, 2009 at 8:12 PM, Matthew Welland <matt at kiatoa.com> wrote:
>> It seems to me that approval and range voting eliminate most of the
>> strategic opportunity in single winner elections and the marginal
>> improvement of other methods is fairly small.
> 
> The recommended strategy in approval is to approve one of the top 2
> and also any other candidates who are above your approval threshold.

That's strategy T. Some times (see Rob LeGrand's dissertation defense 
slides) a "strategy A" is better: approve all that you like better than 
whoever's getting the most Plurality votes, and approve of him as well 
if you prefer him to the one in second place on the Plurality count.

(I think it's a Plurality count. Late here, so "vote-getter" may refer 
to Approval votes - I'm not sure.)