[EM] About non-monotonicity and non-responding to previous posts...
robert bristow-johnson
rbj at audioimagination.com
Thu Nov 5 09:36:13 PST 2009
this is the 3rd or 4th time i forgot to hit "Reply All". can the
list admin *please* fix this so that the EM list is what is in the
Reply-To: header? i almost never remember to hit Reply All.
On Nov 5, 2009, at 9:30 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
> robert bristow-johnson wrote:
>> being pretty much completely converted to the condorcet faith, i
>> have no problem with non-monotonicity that happens to non-
>> condorcet winners. i still do not understand any realistic
>> scenario where non-monotonicity affects the condorcet winner.
>
> What is your opinion regarding methods, such as Nanson, Baldwin,
> and Raynaud, that are nonmonotonic when there is no Condorcet winner?
i dunno any of those methods (references would be nice, but i can
google for them). the only methods i know about are Ranked pairs,
Schulze (but i haven't dug into the actual method to search out all
beatpaths and rank them), Kemeny-Young. i see that Nanson is on the
list at Wikipedia, but not Baldwin nor Raynaud (at least by those
names).
simplicity and sufficient transparency is important to have public
confidence. otherwise i would probably just jump on the Schulze
bandwagon.
i don't think a sequence of elimination rounds would be okay, but the
method of picking the biggest loser for each round needs to be
debated. i am not sure what would be best.
> Do Condorcet winners appear often enough in reality that it is not
> a problem?
since no government yet uses Condorcet, i don't think any of us know
the answer.
but for there to be a paradox, you would need a situation where there
is no predictable voter alignment along a single dimensioned
political spectrum. you would need to have (in 2000) a lot of Nader
voters who choose Bush over Gore as their second choice, and Bush
voters that sincerely choose Nader over Gore, something i really do
not expect.
while having *something* meaningful in law to deal with a Condorcet
cycle, i really think that the lack of "the perfect solution" to the
paradox problem (that likely will never happen in a real election
with real candidates) should not be used as a block to adopting
Condorcet in general. what to do with a cycle can be adjusted at a
later time.
and what we *do* know, is that it is not impossible, not even highly
unlikely for IRV to elect a non-Condorcet winner, even when such
exists. there we have a method that chooses a winner when a
*majority* of us voters have explicitly marked our ballots that we
prefer some other *specific* candidate. the reason i am such a
Condorcet advocate is because the alternative, picking a winner who
the electorate rejected in favor of someone else, simply is counter
to any principle of democracy.
--
r b-j rbj at audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
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