[EM] STV - the transferrable part is OK (fair), the sequential round elimination is not

[Anthony O'Neal]

Kathy Dopp wrote:
> Condorcet is only a single seat method.
>   
Yes but it can be expanded to be proportional mutli-seat and to be 
winner-take-all multi-seat.  I was really talking about the IRV 
properties of STV, since STV is essentially IRV with surplus vote 
transfer added on top.
> There are lots of alternative proportional multi-seat methods such as
> the ones mentioned by Ab dul and others on this list in response to my
> original email such as the tree method, list method and others
> mentioned by Abd ul - all of them better by far than STV.
>   
STV isn't as bad as you are exaggerating it too be and it's the only one 
that has any chance of ever passing, besides party lists.
> Again, STV does not achieve proportional representation unless the
> number of candidates running who represent each interest group is also
> proportional to the number of members of each interest group. Other
> methods achieve proportionality more reliably and also lack the severe
> flaws that STV/IRV exhibit.
>   
I am not sure where you are getting this bizarre property.  STV can 
sometimes distort proportionality if you are using the Hare quota and 
you run more candidates than you have seats.  But this can be largely 
avoided in the Droop quota.
> I prefer Condorcet for single seat districts any day over STV. Any
> voting method on the planet is better than IRV/STV short of
> dictatorship (OK I exagerate this point)
>   
Just a tiny bit.
> Cheers,
>
> Kathy
>
> On Sun, Nov 1, 2009 at 2:52 AM, Anthony O'Neal <watermark0n at gmail.com> wrote:
>   
>> I was thinking of a simialar system before - but not for the same reasons
>> you are.  It was after the BC-STV debacle, and I named it "simplified STV".
>>  My thoughts were that an STV system without the complications of the second
>> part, and only the part that made it proportional, would be easier to sell
>> and less easy to attack by infusing confusion in the population.  I know,
>> however, that such a compromise would actually make the system less than
>> ideal, and my primary hope in proposing such a simplified system is that we
>> could go back and change it later on.
>>
>> My usual thought about IRV is that it basically takes the largest group, and
>> has that group decide amongst itself whom their candidate will be.
>>  Condorcet, on the other hand, takes the largest group, and has that
>> electorate at whole decide who their favorite candidate out of said group
>> will be.  That isn't necessarily an advantage for Condorcet - often people
>> who are voting for more "moderate" candidates are simply doing so out of
>> spite, and so their opinion is of less usefulness.  I don't think a moral
>> argument can really be made for one or the other, but Condorcet is harder to
>> sell and susceptible to more obvious strategy problems.
>>
>> Kathy Dopp wrote:
>>     
>>> People keep asking me how to achieve a proportional representation system
>>> so....
>>>
>>> talking out loud...
>>>
>>> A fair proportional multiseat STV representation system could be made
>>> by eliminating STV's elimination rounds but using the rank choices to
>>> transfer partial votes to a 2nd choice candidate in cases where more
>>> voters than needed for the threshold for each candidate voted for the
>>> same 1st choice candidate.
>>>
>>> If the rank choices were limited to a 1st choice and a 2nd choice
>>> candidate only, unlike Fairytale Vote's IRV/STV method this method
>>> would would be monotonic and precinct-summable (and so be OK to
>>> manually audit and countable in the precincts) using an n x n matrix
>>> where n is the number of candidates running for office.
>>>
>>> In other words, for a multi-seat election where we want proportional
>>> representation, limit voters' choices to a 1st and 2nd choice and
>>> count all voters' 1st choices and transfer excess votes to the voters'
>>> 2nd choices and you're done - no rounds and no transfers of already
>>> transferred votes.
>>>
>>> However, just like with Fairytale Vote's STV system whether or not
>>> this system actually results in proportional representation still
>>> depends on how much vote-splitting results when more or fewer
>>> candidates run for office in proportion to the total number of
>>> candidates running for office, as compared to the proportion of voters
>>> whose interests they represent. I.e. too many candidates running who
>>> represent your interests, or too few and proportional representation
>>> is not achieved using either the Fairytale Vote's STV method or my
>>> (maybe someone else thought of it before) new improved monotonic,
>>> fairer STV method sans any elimination rounds.
>>>
>>> Therefore, a better alternative proportional representation system is
>>> the "party list" system where as many candidates on each party list
>>> take office in proportion to the number of voters who vote for that
>>> party, but this new version of STV I figured out this a.m. (maybe
>>> someone else has thought of it before) would work fine as well as long
>>> as the voters were restricted to ranking only a 1st and 2nd choice
>>> candidate.
>>>
>>> Any method of proportional representation must be precinct-summable in
>>> a reasonable fashion and give all voters' votes equal treatment,
>>> unlike with the current version of IRV/STV being pushed by Fairytale
>>> Vote which does neither and also in addition does not provide
>>> proportional representation due to vote-splitting when the number of
>>> candidates running who represent my interests is too great, or due to
>>> not enough candidates running in proportion to the voters who share my
>>> interests.
>>>
>>> That's why fundamentally the IRV/STV system is a lousy one for
>>> achieving proportional representation even if it were modified to
>>> treat all voters equally and be easily manually checked for accuracy.
>>>
>>> The party list system works much better for achieving proportional
>>> representation as long as there is a party representing your
>>> interests.  It doesn't have to be a "party", but could just be that
>>> each candidate chooses his own list of candidates below him/her to
>>> pass excess votes down to.
>>>
>>>
>>>       
>>     
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