[EM] tactical voting vs different methods

[Kevin Venzke]

Hello,

--- En date de : Jeu 11.6.09, Árpád Magosányi <magwas at rabic.org> a écrit :
> I guess that Schulze's favour-weak-beathpath property
> is example of  favouring cooperation against
> confrontation.
> Any proof or rrebuttal is welcome.

In Schulze you foremost want to defeat every other candidate head-to-head.
If we are even looking at beatpaths, all candidates have failed their 
first goal.

So, if Schulze elects you because the beatpath against you was the
weakest, what does that mean? Only that you were the one who came the 
closest to defeating every other candidate.

It doesn't mean you make more people happy or fewer people angry, except
in the sense that the size of the group of voters that preferred 
somebody else to you, is minimized. This isn't even all voters, it's
voters supporting a candidate involved in the cycle.

I don't see how that encourages cooperation or seeks consensus etc. It's
an intelligent tiebreaker.

> I think that favouring large parties is not the same as
> favouring cooperation.
> Actually I would be content with a method which
> converges to a state where there are at least four major
> parties. I regard two-party system too static.
> 
> Could you point me to studies about this?

Does it have to be a single-winner method?

Kevin Venzke