[EM] tactical voting vs different methods

[Dave Ketchum]

On Jun 10, 2009, at 1:08 PM, Árpád Magosányi wrote:

> Hi!
>
> The underlying assumption of Warren's analysis is that there are two  
> major candidates, and the voter tries to make one of these  
> candidates win "at any cost".
>
> I feel uneasy with this assumption, because
> - here, now I would not entrust any of the top two candidates, and  
> the majority of the population is playing "eliminate one of the  
> candidates at any cost".
> - I would prefer a voting system which makes cooperation beneficial,  
> hence
> - I would like to be in a situation where any of the top two  
> candidates would be largely OK for me, an I could decide between  
> them based on my pet issues, world view or whatever
>
> What I am missing here is analysis of the impact of voting method on  
> the strategy of voters and candidates.
> I hope a model could be set up which helps to understand this, but I  
> have only faint ideas about how it could be done.
>
> And I have a question to Warren - or anyone who bothers to answer -  
> about one of the aspects:
>
> How range voting and Condorcet (specifically Schulze) affects the  
> chances of a cooperative and a confrontative candidate?

Assuming it is likely that a major candidate will win, and that they  
are not equally distasteful (or whatever), I need to vote for the  
better of them.

Those of us wanting to promote a third party, and perhaps hoping for a  
win this time, need to be able to vote third>bettermajor>other.

Neither Plurality nor Approval provide for expressing our desire and,  
perhaps, improving our chances for the next election.  Condorcet  
offers exactly what we desire; Range ratings can help, but determining  
best ratings for Range is more complex.
      As to Condorcet, cycles are possible.   Not likely, but good to  
encourage method to be a flavor of Condorcet whose response to cycles  
pleases us most.

Dave Ketchum