[EM] tactical voting vs different methods

[Árpád Magosányi]

2009/6/10 Juho Laatu <juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk>

> I just want to agree with this
> viewpoint. I have seen e.g. claims
> that Condorcet (that can elect
> compromise candidates) would favour
> candidates that have no strong
> opinions. But I haven't found any
> serious basis behind these claims.
> In all methods candidates try to
> seek optimal position and often
> that is close to the centrist
> opinions. But differences between
> different methods don't seem to
> be very meaningful. Other matters
> in the societies are more important
> in determining the behaviour and
> style of the candidates.


I guess that Schulze's favour-weak-beathpath property is example of
favouring cooperation against confrontation.
Any proof or rrebuttal is welcome.


>
> (Some methods favour large parties
> and that may mean some interest in
> emphasizing the role of unified
> powerful parties etc, but I'm still
> quite far from saying that this
> would determine the style of
> competition between the candidates.)


I think that favouring large parties is not the same as favouring
cooperation.
Actually I would be content with a method which converges to a state where
there are at least four major parties. I regard two-party system too static.
Could you point me to studies about this?
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