[EM] tactical voting vs different methods

[Juho Laatu]

--- On Thu, 11/6/09, Árpád Magosányi <magwas at rabic.org> wrote:

> 2009/6/10 Juho Laatu <juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk>
> > I just want to agree with this
> > viewpoint. I have seen e.g. claims
> > that Condorcet (that can elect
> > compromise candidates) would favour
> > candidates that have no strong
> > opinions. But I haven't found any
> > serious basis behind these claims.
> > In all methods candidates try to
> > seek optimal position and often
> > that is close to the centrist
> > opinions. But differences between
> > different methods don't seem to
> > be very meaningful. Other matters
> > in the societies are more important
> > in determining the behaviour and
> > style of the candidates.
>
> I guess that Schulze's favour-weak-beathpath property
> is example of  favouring cooperation against
> confrontation.
> Any proof or rrebuttal is welcome.

This property may have some benefits
in some situations but in general I
think the impact that this property
will have on candidate behaviour may
be quite marginal for the following
reasons.

- Condorcet elections often have a
  Condorcet winner
- If not, then most Condorcet methods
  decide the same way anyway in most
  cases
- If not, then the impact of the
  beatpath property may not be very
  strong
- And if it is, still the candidates
  may not understand this
- And if they understand, they may
  also understand that it seldom has
  any impact

It may very well be that other factors
like e.g. the verbal description of
the method (words like "weak beatpath")
may have more impact on the behaviour
of the candidates than the actual
technical properties of the methods.



If I try to think hard what impact the
Condorcet methods in general might have
on the bevaviour of the politicians it
seems that the interest to collect
second preferences might have some impact.
That means that the candidates are less
likely to say that the supporters of the
neighouring groups (that may contain
potential second preference voters)
would be totally wrong. This however
applies also to methods where the
candidate tries to make supporters of
the other groups change their first
preference opinions. I can't draw any
clear conclusions from this.

One more attempt. Electoral systems and
methods that clearly react to changes in
voter opinions may make the politicians
less arrogant towards the voters, and
maybe towards the other representatives
of the voters as well. That would speak
to some extent in favour of Condorcet
methods leading to a more harmonious
society.

> > (Some methods favour large parties
> > and that may mean some interest in
> > emphasizing the role of unified
> > powerful parties etc, but I'm still
> > quite far from saying that this
> > would determine the style of
> > competition between the candidates.)
>
> I think that favouring large parties is not the same as
> favouring cooperation.
> Actually I would be content with a method which
> converges to a state where there are at least four major
> parties. I regard two-party system too static.

Yes, the impact may not be meaningful.
The impact may also be reverse in the
sense that if some method never gives
a chance to some minority opinions
then the major party candidates might
intentionally never co-operate with
those people. (And this might again be
cancelled by some major party taking
a positive attitude towards this
minority in order to win them on its
own side.)

> Could you point me to studies about this?

I'm afraid no. I don't have any such
good material.


The interest to grab voters in all
directions seems to be a general
method independent trend. On the
other hand we have seen that in
some societies also negative
campaigning has become an equally
important trend. Probably the
moral values of the society and
voter judgement will have much
higher impact on the behaviour
than the used election method.

A compromise seeking society
might decide to use Condorcet
methods but use of Condorcet
methods may not make the society
more compromise seeking. The
overall positive impact of well
working methods that let the
voters decide was the best example
I could find on methods influencing
the behaviour of the politicians.
No strong links to the Schulze method
in particular yet (except that one
can always market methods that one
thinks are good in a positive spirit
and thereby make the voters trust the
system more and as a result make the
democracy work better and make the
politicians less self-centred and
better listeners).

Juho