[EM] National Popular Vote & Condorcet

[Dave Ketchum]

Now it is July 1 and I have responses from kislanko at airmail.net, jlundell at pobox.com 
, Markus Schulze.

Merging is possible, provided each state provides and describes data  
suitable for this purpose, such as:
      Condorcet X*X array.  Because of possibility of extra candidates  
from some states, each state should be required to include data for a  
dummy candidate who gets no votes in that state - such can be included  
for each such extra candidate.
      Plurality data - suitable for both states which do Plurality,  
and for those who use some method not provided for.  For such an X*X  
array is filled out with data as if votes reported had been reported  
for the candidate strictly preferred by each of the state's voters -  
and entered in the X*X array as if voted in Condorcet.
      Approval data - needs thought but my initial thought is as if  
each approval was a plurality vote - does mean a voter approving 2  
gets 2 votes counted but relative counts per candidate comes out ok.
      IRV or Range - examples of methods that should be avoided by  
states willing to have their data included - unless they are willing  
and able to convert to a method that is supported.

Some question merging data from different types of sources - I claim  
it is doable provided the source type is provided for and the data  
properly labelled.

Markus Schulze says to use the Schulze method for cycles - that should  
be considered when agreeing on details.  I would add that there should  
be ONE X*X array for the US for this purpose, so that all cooperating  
states give the same instructions to their electors.

On Jun 30, 2009, at 11:57 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:

> Food for thought:
>
> The "National Popular Vote" effort is a proper attempt to hear  
> voters better in electing a President - votes from all states would  
> get counted, unlike the present problem that, in many states, all of  
> the states electoral votes will go to the known and expected winner  
> of that state's voting - which, in turn, discourages candidates from  
> being much concerned with trying to increase their vote count from  
> such states.
>
> But, how should the votes be counted when merging the votes from  
> multiple states?  I suspect Plurality is expected because all states  
> know how to do that.
>
> How about Condorcet?  It lets voters express themselves more  
> completely, but then we have to be concerned with some states not  
> being prepared to do Condorcet electing.
>
> I propose here that that is not a proper concern.  Condorcet, of  
> course, counts, merging together votes:
>     as in Plurality - and thus could count in votes from states  
> offering only Plurality.
>     as in Approval - assuming, as is proper, that such could be  
> voted in real Condorcet.
>     of what Condorcet offers.
>
> Knowing what a voter votes in Plurality or Approval, the counters  
> simply count what would have been counted for the voter if the voter  
> had voted such in a Condorcet election.
>
> This both allows merging together what different states may be  
> prepared to offer, and gives them a path toward general use of  
> Condorcet - a tolerable destination.
>
> Admittedly this ignores such as Range and Borda - but gives voters  
> better power than Plurality, while minimizing what new they could be  
> asked to learn.
>
> Note that Condorcet is more tolerant than most, of different sets of  
> candidates being offered in different states.  Conceded that such is  
> undesirable but, assuming Condorcet, voters can both vote what is  
> generally agreed on as to expectable winners, and what odd may be  
> added for their state.
>
> Dave Ketchum