[EM] STV and weighted positional methods

[Jonathan Lundell]

On Jan 30, 2009, at 9:56 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:

> The war here is over IRV/STV, which Kathy attacks, Terry defends,  
> and I agree that kathy should win.
>
> On Fri, 30 Jan 2009 19:57:10 -0700 Kathy Dopp wrote:
>>> From: "Terry Bouricius" <terryb at burlingtontelecom.net>
>>> Subject: Re: [EM] STV and weighted positional methods
>>> What is even more puzzling is Ms. Dopp's continued defense of  
>>> plurality
>>> voting.
> I chased this one a bit:
>     Did not see Kathy doing such.
>     Did not see her attacking Condorcet as if Plurality was better  
> than that (Condorcet interests me).
>
> Stumbled on something Terry wrote Thu, 29 Jan 2009 15:37:01 -0500:
>     It seems suspect for a method to fail to elect a candidate
>     when a majority prefers that candidate to all other candidates.

Terry was referring to a single majority. In the IRV example below  
there is no set of 7 voters who prefer A to all other candidates. Only  
three voters, 1/4 of the total, prefer A to all other voters. The  
example at hand was a Borda count in which there was such a majority  
that fails to prevail:

51: A > C > B > D
5: C > B > D > A
23: B > C > D > A
21: D > C > B > A

>
>
> Let's see:
>     3 A>B>C
>     4 B>A>C
>     5 C>A>B
>
> A liked better than B?  YES 8>4
> A liked better than C?  YES 7>5
> A liked better than all other candidates?  YES - B&C is all other.