[EM] STV and weighted positional methods
jlundell at pobox.com
Fri Jan 30 23:32:56 PST 2009
On Jan 30, 2009, at 9:56 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
> The war here is over IRV/STV, which Kathy attacks, Terry defends,
> and I agree that kathy should win.
> On Fri, 30 Jan 2009 19:57:10 -0700 Kathy Dopp wrote:
>>> From: "Terry Bouricius" <terryb at burlingtontelecom.net>
>>> Subject: Re: [EM] STV and weighted positional methods
>>> What is even more puzzling is Ms. Dopp's continued defense of
> I chased this one a bit:
> Did not see Kathy doing such.
> Did not see her attacking Condorcet as if Plurality was better
> than that (Condorcet interests me).
> Stumbled on something Terry wrote Thu, 29 Jan 2009 15:37:01 -0500:
> It seems suspect for a method to fail to elect a candidate
> when a majority prefers that candidate to all other candidates.
Terry was referring to a single majority. In the IRV example below
there is no set of 7 voters who prefer A to all other candidates. Only
three voters, 1/4 of the total, prefer A to all other voters. The
example at hand was a Borda count in which there was such a majority
that fails to prevail:
51: A > C > B > D
5: C > B > D > A
23: B > C > D > A
21: D > C > B > A
> Let's see:
> 3 A>B>C
> 4 B>A>C
> 5 C>A>B
> A liked better than B? YES 8>4
> A liked better than C? YES 7>5
> A liked better than all other candidates? YES - B&C is all other.
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