[EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent

[Michael Allan]

> > Hopefully the negative parts are corrected in the synergy with the
> > government's voting systems (?).
 
Juho Laatu wrote:

> You indicated that you would use this
> method so that it would not be tied to
> the formal decision making process.
> That reduces the continuous voting
> related problems.

Yes, so we're agreed, rationalization is good in that instance.  Two
specialized voting systems that intercommunicate (state and public)
can give better results than one system, on its own.
 
> The public vote is maybe more ""sincere""
> in the sense that that opinion will hold
> (since doing otherwise would not look nice)
> but not more sincere in the sense of
> representing her true feelings inside
> (maybe e.g. more unstable ones).

True, rigid opinions are not sincere.  And I never considered that a
fear of admitting past mistakes could make public expression
(including votes) more rigid than private - but only in some cases, as
the level of fear varies widely.

On the other hand, I argue that public expression is likely to be more
sincere (also truthful and legitimate), not only because of
*anticipation* of challenges, but also because of actual challenges.
So a vote may be challenged as insincere if it is inconsistent with
other expressions of the voter - "I don't believe you are sincere.
You say one thing, and you do another!"  Such challenges are not
possible when the vote is kept private.

Likewise, a vote may be challenged as untruthful if it's for something
manifestly false - e.g. an urban transit plan that defies the laws of
physics - "Don't you realize?  You're voting for a plan that assumes
zero gravity!"  But this challenge requires a public vote.

Likewise, a vote may be challenged as illegitimate if it's for
something that would contradict an accepted norm - e.g. a vote to
expell all people of a particular skin colour - "Don't you realize?
You're voting to discriminate on the basis of race!"  But again, this
challenge requires a public vote.

> In addition I think that also the secret
> vote based methods of modern societies
> could benefit of corresponding
> deliberative/proxy systems. I note that
> the (at least partially) secret vote
> based systems are likely to be able to
> collect opinions from wider set of
> citizens, and the expressed opinions may
> reflect more the internal feelings of
> the voters (as opposed to publicly
> expressed commitments that the public
> votes/expressions tend to record).

Agreed, and the mix is beneficial both across system types (as in
rationalization), and within a single system.

In latter case, a mix can sometimes be the *ideal*, I agree.  In
general, however, there is no *feasible* alternative to a mix.  No
pure method (like secret ballot alone) can be generally enforced
across all public systems, even if the enforcement is restricted to a
subset of voters (such as non-delegates) - ref. discussion w/ Dave
K. - so the pure systems are nothing but a lab curiosity.

> Both public debate and secret vote based
> opinion measuring are needed and may be
> developed further. Mixtures of these two
> are possible and may collect benefits of
> both (and some of the problems too).

-- 
Michael Allan

Toronto, 647-436-4521
http://zelea.com/