[EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent

[Juho Laatu]

--- On Fri, 23/1/09, Michael Allan <mike at zelea.com> wrote:

> > I think current systems rely on
> > private voting and public discussion
> > (although different than the proxy
> > based discussion). It may be possible
> > to enrich this with better mutual
> > discussion / delegable voting rights
> > without sacrificing secret votes /
> > privacy.
> 
> Yes, it might be *possible*, but I think it would be
> difficult in
> practice (and not ideal in principle) to do so within a
> *single*
> voting system.  The most rational design is separate,
> special purpose
> systems (primary and general) that work together.

I was thinking about public formal
elections (e.g. parliamentary). They
nowadays generally use secret votes.
Doing that same at the very bottom
level of a proxy system would not be
too difficult.

> > I don't see the need of a
> > representative / proxy to know who
> > her voters exactly are to be crucial.
> > In some aspect it is better that she
> > doesn't know (no vote buying,
> > services to those that voted, no hard
> > feelings against those that this time
> > voted someone else etc.).
> > 
> > The (secret) voters on the other hand
> > will get more power when they can let
> > several representatives / proxies
> > understand that they got or may get
> > the vote :-).
> 
> All of this is easier, more natural, if agreement (voter
> for
> candidate/delegate) is *actually* expressed.  Then it's
> more human.
> We weren't *built* to deal with the strange paradox of
> private
> expression (collective mass opinion).  There's no
> natural correlate
> for it.

Secret votes could also be seen as an
invention of the human race that relieves
some problems that they have (coercion,
vote buying, fear of revealing too much
of oneself).

Juho