[EM] Multiwinner Condorcet generalization on 1D politics

[Diego Santos]

2009/2/15 Dan Bishop <danbishop04 at gmail.com>

> STV-CLE just happens to work the best when the political spectrum is
> one-dimensional: Candidates are eliminated at the ends of the spectrum until
> someone has a quota, and the process continues until candidates are neatly
> spaced a quota apart.
>
> But with multiple dimensions, the CLs' votes get split among multiple
> candidates, so you have to eliminate more candidates until someone meets
> quota.  This creates a much stronger centrist bias than the 1-dimensional
> case.


The flaw in STV-CLE I see is that the candidate elimination heuristics is
based in a majoritarian criterion in a PR method. I think that a good
heuristic to eliminate a candidate should be based a PR quota, like
Newland-Britton. Some months ago I desgined the "Bucklin elimination STV" (I
don't have a definite name for it). When no candidate reaches a quota, then
later preferences are added until some candidadate reaches the quota. But,
instead of this candidate is considered elected, the candidate with the
least sum is eliminated. Some examples with this method has generated good
outcomes.

________________________________
Diego Santos
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