[EM] Time of trouble - Premise 2

[Juho Laatu]

First some general comments.

Still the biggest question to me is how
to create a system that is dominant
(determines the de facto unquestioned
public opinion) and at the same time
remains in close contact and attracts
spontaneous participation of the
citizens and is out of the control of
the parties or people with some party
like agenda. Maybe the most promising
viewpoint is to see the system as a new
"Google" or "Wikipedia" that grows
quickly so large that it is not easy to
control it or question its status. This
case is a bit different of course. One
would need wide participation (to avoid
being just the voice of some
"extremists"), one could need country
specific systems or registrations,
decisions on what elections will be
arranged or are important, Wikipedia
like strong rules that keep the system
healthy etc. This is not an impossible
task but taking into account the role
of politics in the societies one can be
sure that this is not straight forward
task either.

See more detailed inside the mail and
some more generic again at the end.

--- On Wed, 11/2/09, Michael Allan <mike at zelea.com> wrote:

> The claim is that a direct democracy is probable.  Based on
> Juho
> Laatu's comments, I restate the argument in an expanded
> form.  If it
> stands, then we can accept it as a premise, and discuss the
> potential
> danger of it.
> 
> What follows is a condensed summary of the original post
> and
> discussion thread, "The structuring of power and the
> composition of
> norms by communicative assent":
> http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2009-January/thread.html#23872
> 
>   Term     Meaning
>   ------- 
> -----------------------------------------------------------
>   A        Administrative action, either of:
>     A(n)    - enforcement of a norm;
>     A(o)    - placement of an official.
>            
>   DD       Direct democracy.
>   FS       Free speech.
>            
>   IT       Internet/information technology that:
>     IT(a)   - authenticates voters as real people (no
> robots);
>     IT(c)   - affords a consensus that neither suppresses
> dissent,
>               nor is unnecessarily fragmented by it;
>     IT(p)   - allows voters to openly propose the issue and
> options,
>               not just to vote on them;
>     IT(r)   - restricts votes to those affected by the
> issue, such as
>               local residents;
>     IT(s)   - enforces a single vote per person (no sock
> puppets).

IT seems to refer to voting/polling
specific IT. If so then it could be
called also VT.

>            
>   OP       Public opinion, either of:
>     OP(i)   - informal public communication;
>     OP(f)   - formal public vote.
>            
>   OR       Private opinion, either of:
>     OR(i)   - informal private belief or communication;
>     OR(f)   - formal private vote.
>            
>   PD       Public decision, on either of:
>     PD(n)   - enforcement of a norm;
>     PD(o)   - placement of an official.
>            
>   RD       Representative democracy.
>  
> --------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> FS is a constitutional fact.  FS allows for OP(i), and
> OP(i) is an
> everyday fact:
> 
>   (a.1)  FS  ->  OP(i)

I read "A -> B" as "if A is widespread
then also B is or will be widespread".
This could cover also cases "B is
likely to be widespread" and "B can be
widespread".

> 
> But several projects are developing IT ^[1].  The
> technology is
> probably feasible.  So people will use it to formalize
> OP(i) as votes:
> 
>   (a.2)  OP(i) + IT  ->  OP(f)

Or "->  OR(f)". I mean that votes could
be secret too. I assume in these terms
the "publicity" vs. "privacy" refers to
the secrecy of the ballot, not to the
unofficial vs. official nature of the
vote. Maybe you intended otherwise.

> 
> But the resulting OP(f) is generally visible.  Other people
> can see
> it, and are prompted to form private opinions of their own
> - OR(i) -
> either in assent or dissent of the issue.  Furthermore,
> some of these
> opinions will be published and formalized as votes.  So
> OR(i) and
> OP(f) will be locked in a positive feedback loop:
> 
>   (a.3)  OP(f)  ->  OR(i)  ->  OP(f)
> 
> But IT(c) ensures that any OP(f) dissensus that is not
> grounded in a
> social reality will be unstable.  It will therefore fall
> toward
> consensus.  So we can expect consensus. 

If we have IT(c) (and the other
conditions).

> Any consensus that
> attracts a
> quorum of voters (however defined), and that holds stable,
> is PD by
> definition.
> 
>   (a.4)  OP(f) + IT(c)  ->  OP(f,consensus)  =  PD

You didn't include the quorum
requirement in the equation. One could
add additional requirements like
IT(u,t), IT that is used and trusted
widely, to derive PD.

> 
> On the one hand, the IT may be configured to support
> primary
> elections, and thus to to nominate cross-party candidates
> for office:

I guess these nominations could be
unofficial.

> 
>   (a.5)  OP(f) + IT(c)  ->  PD(o)
> 
> On the other hand, IT(p) allows issues to be raised without
> restriction.  So PD may focus on norms (laws, plans and
> policies) too:
> 
>   (a.6)  OP(f) + IT(c,p)  ->  PD(n)

Before this statement the claims seemed
to be able to cover both official and
unofficial votes (=> PD could be
official too). Here IT(p) seems to
refer to cases where regular citizens
have more power than they have in a
typical RD.

> 
> To summarize (a.1) to (a.6): IT makes PD probable:
> 
>   (a)    FS + IT  ->  PD

It seems you assumed IT(c,p,u,t,...),
and PD(o,n) as the result. One can
interpret "->" also so that there is a
tendency to go in this direction but
not that the end result would be
guaranteed or probable. All the
conditions and equations were maybe not
100% strict, and many smaller conditions
may also be missing.

> 
> RD is a constitutional fact.  OR(i) is a psychological
> fact.  At the
> regular occurence of general elections, OR(i) is formally
> expressed in
> secret voting.  The administration then acts to place the
> winning
> candidates in office.  This process is a fact:
> 
>   (b.1)  RD + OR(i)  ->  OR(f)  ->  A(o)

This seems to assume that OR(f) always
refers to the official elections (and
not to the unofficial IT stuff).

> 
> But note the alignment of OR(i) and OP(f) in eqn (a.3). 
> Furthermore,
> from (a.3), allow a rough parity between the levels of
> primary and
> general turnout.  It then follows from (a.5) that OR(i) is
> generally
> aligned with PD(o). 

Maybe it is safer to say that the IT
generates such tendencies.

> So (b.1) reduces to:
> 
>   (b.2)  RD + PD(o)  ->  A(o)
> 
> In other words, the general elections of RD will actualize
> the primary
> elections of PD(o).  Thus officials will be emplaced - A(o)
> - by
> public decision.

This equation is confusing. In (b.1) you
assumed that OR(f) -> A(o). Does this
mean that RD + OR(i) -> PD(o) -> OR(f)
-> A(o)? In this formulation PD(o) has
only indirect power via OR(f) to
determine A(o). The equation works both
with and without PD(o).

> 
> Now consider norms.  First, consider the situation when
> PD(n) is
> framed as a legislative bill.  It will then be of interest
> to a member
> of the RD legislature.  The member will be particularly
> interested in
> the level of support for the bill among her own
> constituents, as
> revealed by IT(a,r,s).  Considering that her re-election
> bid will
> depend (b.2) on her successful performance in the ongoing
> primary
> elections,

Official primary elections of the party
or something less formal?

> she will align her assembly vote with the
> particular PD(n)
> of her constituents.  The same consideration applies to the
> other
> members.  The upshot is that the legislature will
> promulgate the
> general PD(n) as a statutory law:

Note that often politicians tend to
follow opinion polls quite closely
already now. (In some parties they
need to follow also the views of the
party members.)

> 
>   (b.3)  RD + PD(n) + A(o)  ->  A(n)
> 
> Likewise for the other types of norm (n).  So, when PD(n =
> policy) is
> expressed, the elected executives will act to follow that
> policy.
> When PD(n = plan) is expressed, they will act to implement
> that plan.
> 
> >From (b.1) to (b.3), it follows that both the placement
> of officials
> and the enforcement of societal norms will be aligned with
> public
> decisions:
> 
>   (b.4)  PD + RD  ->  A(o) + A(n)
> 
> But PD is a decision of the people.  By definition, when
> A(o) and A(n)
> are aligned with PD, society functions as DD.  So (b.4)
> reduces to:
> 
>   (b)    PD + RD  ->  DD
> 
> QED. 

I think you proved the tendency (or
possible chain of consequences or
existence of the path) but not the
necessity of this to happen or that
it will happen in full strength.

DD seems to be still defined as RD
that acts as if it was a true DD.

Note that a true supporter and loyal
member of some current democratic system
could claim that the system already
implements PD + RD -> DD (with the help
of polls, media, party memberships, open
discussion, free organisations,
elections, politicians that listen to
the opinions). The question is then how
strong the arrows ("->") are in each case.

> We can further reduce (a) and (b): to
> 
>   (c)    RD + FS + IT  ->  DD
> 
> Given that RD and FS are constitutional facts, the
> immediate cause of
> DD is the introduction of IT.

IT could be said to have potential to
strengthen the DD properties of the RD.

> 
> This DD is unlike the direct democracy of classical Athens.

(In Athens the decision makers were an
elite, which pushes the system a bit
closer to a RD. Switzerland has some
"bottom level DD orientation".)

>  The
> people are not, in this case, part of the government. 
> Nevertheless
> they proceed to make decisions as though they were (a), and
> the
> government chooses to act in compliance with them (b.3). 
> The people
> are powerless to enforce this compliance, and so time is
> allowed for
> both sides to engage in dialogue and negotiation.  But the
> people do
> have the power to replace the government at the next
> general election,
> and their ability to make deliberate use of that power is
> enhanced
> (b.2).

I read this as an interest and
possibility to use IT to strengthen
the "DD chain".

> 
> Juho Laatu wrote:
> 
> > >   1. Someone posts the question, "What
> voting method ought
> > > Helsinki to use in Council elections?"
> > > 
> > >   2. All kinds of opinions are expressed, left
> and right.  Many
> > > people from Helsinki join the list.
> > 
> > This could maybe already be called PO
> > (public sphere opinion-formation) where
> > people form opinions, but that does not
> > necessarily lead to formation of one
> > unified opinion (=> PD, public sphere
> > decision-making).
> 
> In terms of the revised notation, this is OP(i).
> 
> > My thinking was that anything above
> > (public sphere) random chatting and
> > below forming one (society wide)
> > unified opinion is PO.
> 
> I've tried to clarify the different types of opinion. 
> Random chatting
> is OP(i), and random voting is OP(f).  When OP(f) gels in
> consensus,
> then it is PD.
> 
>   OP(i) ..  ->  OP(f) ..  ->  PD
> 
> > The communication part of IT is there.
> > There are also voting machines available
> > in the internet but obviously this
> > community has no agreement on which one
> > to use or whether to use its own (the
> > members are skilled enough to build one).
> 
> The argument requires voting IT.  The rest is given, in
> fact.
> 
> However, the voting IT must be IT(a,c,p,r,s).  None of the
> voting
> methods that are typically discussed in election-methods
> can do IT(c),
> for instance, except Abd's delegable proxy.
> 
> It might not be worthwhile for a mailing list to start
> voting on
> issues.  It is not a city or sovereign state.  Its power is
> limited to
> issues of technical administration.  The important issues
> of election
> methods are decided by cities and sovereign states.

Are you saying that they should not
even try? Who should then try?

> 
> To build the necessary IT requires no prior agreement.  As
> a rule of
> thumb, an open source developer can expect no help until he
> has users.
> He codes the beta, solo.  (Myself, I'm close to beta
> with Votorola, a
> matter of months.)  Private business firms can move faster,
> at least
> initially, because they can purchase labour.

Success depends heavily on the quality
of the software and the robustness of
the concept in general.

> 
> > Or if there are multiple competing
> > opinion formation camps.
> 
> Yes, but those camps will be unstable, because:
>  
> > > ... The institution of PD is a natural
> monopoly...
> > 
> > It could also be that different "parties"
> > would concentrate around their favourite
> > system and claim it to be the leading
> > one, or at least the one that is correct.
> 
> Or different companies will push their own brands, and
> consumers will
> camp out in them.  But (i) such divisions are unlikely to
> be stable,
> as they reduce value to the voters, and those voters have
> the power to
> act in their own interests.  One by one, they can move to
> whichever
> system that has the largest pool of votes.  They will tend,
> therefore,
> to support a single system.

Why would one system among the others
emerge as the stable system? (In the
beginning of this mail I referred to
the Google and Wikipedia phenomena as
potential patterns to follow.)

> 
> Moreover (ii) IT can bridge multiple systems by pooling the
> results.
> All it takes is a communication standard, and two system
> developers
> that agree to adopt it.  The separate votes are then
> pooled, the
> voters are brought closer to a quorum, and the prospect of
> action (A).
> Other systems will want to join the standard, or risk
> alienating their
> voters.  In the end, all systems must join the standard. 
> Thus joined,
> they will effectively be a single system.
> 
> > Citizens can maintain such systems in a
> > FS+IT society if they are sufficiently
> > active and persistent. That is at least
> > PO. PD might require a recognized
> > position as the de facto opinion former
> > (in my interpretation of it).
> 
> Yes, it depends on the IT being a technical monopoly.  I
> agree.
> 
> > > > What I learned at this round is that
> > > > you see the PD to consist of one single
> > > > official or de facto recognized process.
> > > > In this case the opinion formation may
> > > > be clear and the messages heard by the
> > > > RD representatives. The process may not
> > > > be a free public sphere process any more
> > > > but if it is well managed it may
> > > > represent in many aspects the true
> > > > feelings of the people quite well
> > > > (~= "official continuous polls").
> > > 
> > > No longer of the public sphere?  That makes me
> think that the
> > > institution of PD might have a history like that
> of Parliament.
> > > Parliament was once situated in the public sphere
> ...
> 
> [I was wrong.  Parliament was never in the public sphere. 
> It only had
> a relation with the public, a relation that has since been
> lost.]
> 
> The idea of capturing PD is interesting.  The support IT
> does have an
> administrative component, so it would be a natural capture
> for
> government, or for a business firm (administrators par
> excellence).
> If captured, PD either is, or isn't deliberately
> hampered.  If it
> isn't, then there is no effect - nothing to discuss.

I referred to Wikipedia like strong
rules above. Maybe current information
technology allows this type of free wide
scale voluntary activities to escape the
traditional control points of the old
rule.

> 
> If PD *is* deliberately hampered, then the captor must have
> accepted
> the premise of probable DD, and be acting in response to
> the perceived
> danger of it - either in protection of its own narrow
> interests, or of
> the broader interests of society. 

I must note here that the original fine
principles of democracy and its further
enhancements are still valid but somehow
politicians and others have found ways
to play the game in a somewhat less ideal
way than originally (idealistically)
intended. I'm sure that there will be
similar tendencies also in the future.
The new system must be planned well to
avoid this type of pitfalls as
efficiently as possible.

> Furthermore, the mode of
> capture
> may itself pose a danger.  So maybe we can discuss this in
> the parent
> thread, later - it probably has no bearing on the premise.

I mentioned the possibility of the chain
towards DD being weaker than certain and
automatic. The inevitable corruption
and/or inclusion of various interests,
less than perfect understanding and
monitoring etc. is another potential
factor that may weaken the system.

At this point I might also mention one
more topic that I consider important.
That is the role of the chairman and
opinion formation in the system. One
can not trust IT(p,c) to be a sufficient
mechanism to keep the discussion focused
and lead to selection of the best
formulations of the questions and
modelling of the society and topics in
question. Better new mechanisms are
needed also on that sector.

Juho


> 
> 
> [1] For an overview of projects currently developing the
> IT, see:
>     http://zelea.com/project/votorola/compare.xht
> 
> -- 
> Michael Allan
> 
> Toronto, 647-436-4521
> http://zelea.com/
> 
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see
> http://electorama.com/em for list info