[EM] Time of trouble - Premise 2

[Michael Allan]

The claim is that a direct democracy is probable.  Based on Juho
Laatu's comments, I restate the argument in an expanded form.  If it
stands, then we can accept it as a premise, and discuss the potential
danger of it.

What follows is a condensed summary of the original post and
discussion thread, "The structuring of power and the composition of
norms by communicative assent":
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2009-January/thread.html#23872

  Term     Meaning
  -------  -----------------------------------------------------------
  A        Administrative action, either of:
    A(n)    - enforcement of a norm;
    A(o)    - placement of an official.
           
  DD       Direct democracy.
  FS       Free speech.
           
  IT       Internet/information technology that:
    IT(a)   - authenticates voters as real people (no robots);
    IT(c)   - affords a consensus that neither suppresses dissent,
              nor is unnecessarily fragmented by it;
    IT(p)   - allows voters to openly propose the issue and options,
              not just to vote on them;
    IT(r)   - restricts votes to those affected by the issue, such as
              local residents;
    IT(s)   - enforces a single vote per person (no sock puppets).
           
  OP       Public opinion, either of:
    OP(i)   - informal public communication;
    OP(f)   - formal public vote.
           
  OR       Private opinion, either of:
    OR(i)   - informal private belief or communication;
    OR(f)   - formal private vote.
           
  PD       Public decision, on either of:
    PD(n)   - enforcement of a norm;
    PD(o)   - placement of an official.
           
  RD       Representative democracy.
  --------------------------------------------------------------------

FS is a constitutional fact.  FS allows for OP(i), and OP(i) is an
everyday fact:

  (a.1)  FS  ->  OP(i)

But several projects are developing IT ^[1].  The technology is
probably feasible.  So people will use it to formalize OP(i) as votes:

  (a.2)  OP(i) + IT  ->  OP(f)

But the resulting OP(f) is generally visible.  Other people can see
it, and are prompted to form private opinions of their own - OR(i) -
either in assent or dissent of the issue.  Furthermore, some of these
opinions will be published and formalized as votes.  So OR(i) and
OP(f) will be locked in a positive feedback loop:

  (a.3)  OP(f)  ->  OR(i)  ->  OP(f)

But IT(c) ensures that any OP(f) dissensus that is not grounded in a
social reality will be unstable.  It will therefore fall toward
consensus.  So we can expect consensus.  Any consensus that attracts a
quorum of voters (however defined), and that holds stable, is PD by
definition.

  (a.4)  OP(f) + IT(c)  ->  OP(f,consensus)  =  PD

On the one hand, the IT may be configured to support primary
elections, and thus to to nominate cross-party candidates for office:

  (a.5)  OP(f) + IT(c)  ->  PD(o)

On the other hand, IT(p) allows issues to be raised without
restriction.  So PD may focus on norms (laws, plans and policies) too:

  (a.6)  OP(f) + IT(c,p)  ->  PD(n)

To summarize (a.1) to (a.6): IT makes PD probable:

  (a)    FS + IT  ->  PD

RD is a constitutional fact.  OR(i) is a psychological fact.  At the
regular occurence of general elections, OR(i) is formally expressed in
secret voting.  The administration then acts to place the winning
candidates in office.  This process is a fact:

  (b.1)  RD + OR(i)  ->  OR(f)  ->  A(o)

But note the alignment of OR(i) and OP(f) in eqn (a.3).  Furthermore,
from (a.3), allow a rough parity between the levels of primary and
general turnout.  It then follows from (a.5) that OR(i) is generally
aligned with PD(o).  So (b.1) reduces to:

  (b.2)  RD + PD(o)  ->  A(o)

In other words, the general elections of RD will actualize the primary
elections of PD(o).  Thus officials will be emplaced - A(o) - by
public decision.

Now consider norms.  First, consider the situation when PD(n) is
framed as a legislative bill.  It will then be of interest to a member
of the RD legislature.  The member will be particularly interested in
the level of support for the bill among her own constituents, as
revealed by IT(a,r,s).  Considering that her re-election bid will
depend (b.2) on her successful performance in the ongoing primary
elections, she will align her assembly vote with the particular PD(n)
of her constituents.  The same consideration applies to the other
members.  The upshot is that the legislature will promulgate the
general PD(n) as a statutory law:

  (b.3)  RD + PD(n) + A(o)  ->  A(n)

Likewise for the other types of norm (n).  So, when PD(n = policy) is
expressed, the elected executives will act to follow that policy.
When PD(n = plan) is expressed, they will act to implement that plan.

>From (b.1) to (b.3), it follows that both the placement of officials
and the enforcement of societal norms will be aligned with public
decisions:

  (b.4)  PD + RD  ->  A(o) + A(n)

But PD is a decision of the people.  By definition, when A(o) and A(n)
are aligned with PD, society functions as DD.  So (b.4) reduces to:

  (b)    PD + RD  ->  DD

QED.  We can further reduce (a) and (b): to

  (c)    RD + FS + IT  ->  DD

Given that RD and FS are constitutional facts, the immediate cause of
DD is the introduction of IT.

This DD is unlike the direct democracy of classical Athens.  The
people are not, in this case, part of the government.  Nevertheless
they proceed to make decisions as though they were (a), and the
government chooses to act in compliance with them (b.3).  The people
are powerless to enforce this compliance, and so time is allowed for
both sides to engage in dialogue and negotiation.  But the people do
have the power to replace the government at the next general election,
and their ability to make deliberate use of that power is enhanced
(b.2).

Juho Laatu wrote:

> >   1. Someone posts the question, "What voting method ought
> > Helsinki to use in Council elections?"
> > 
> >   2. All kinds of opinions are expressed, left and right.  Many
> > people from Helsinki join the list.
> 
> This could maybe already be called PO
> (public sphere opinion-formation) where
> people form opinions, but that does not
> necessarily lead to formation of one
> unified opinion (=> PD, public sphere
> decision-making).

In terms of the revised notation, this is OP(i).

> My thinking was that anything above
> (public sphere) random chatting and
> below forming one (society wide)
> unified opinion is PO.

I've tried to clarify the different types of opinion.  Random chatting
is OP(i), and random voting is OP(f).  When OP(f) gels in consensus,
then it is PD.

  OP(i) ..  ->  OP(f) ..  ->  PD

> The communication part of IT is there.
> There are also voting machines available
> in the internet but obviously this
> community has no agreement on which one
> to use or whether to use its own (the
> members are skilled enough to build one).

The argument requires voting IT.  The rest is given, in fact.

However, the voting IT must be IT(a,c,p,r,s).  None of the voting
methods that are typically discussed in election-methods can do IT(c),
for instance, except Abd's delegable proxy.

It might not be worthwhile for a mailing list to start voting on
issues.  It is not a city or sovereign state.  Its power is limited to
issues of technical administration.  The important issues of election
methods are decided by cities and sovereign states.

To build the necessary IT requires no prior agreement.  As a rule of
thumb, an open source developer can expect no help until he has users.
He codes the beta, solo.  (Myself, I'm close to beta with Votorola, a
matter of months.)  Private business firms can move faster, at least
initially, because they can purchase labour.

> Or if there are multiple competing
> opinion formation camps.

Yes, but those camps will be unstable, because:
 
> > ... The institution of PD is a natural monopoly...
> 
> It could also be that different "parties"
> would concentrate around their favourite
> system and claim it to be the leading
> one, or at least the one that is correct.

Or different companies will push their own brands, and consumers will
camp out in them.  But (i) such divisions are unlikely to be stable,
as they reduce value to the voters, and those voters have the power to
act in their own interests.  One by one, they can move to whichever
system that has the largest pool of votes.  They will tend, therefore,
to support a single system.

Moreover (ii) IT can bridge multiple systems by pooling the results.
All it takes is a communication standard, and two system developers
that agree to adopt it.  The separate votes are then pooled, the
voters are brought closer to a quorum, and the prospect of action (A).
Other systems will want to join the standard, or risk alienating their
voters.  In the end, all systems must join the standard.  Thus joined,
they will effectively be a single system.

> Citizens can maintain such systems in a
> FS+IT society if they are sufficiently
> active and persistent. That is at least
> PO. PD might require a recognized
> position as the de facto opinion former
> (in my interpretation of it).

Yes, it depends on the IT being a technical monopoly.  I agree.

> > > What I learned at this round is that
> > > you see the PD to consist of one single
> > > official or de facto recognized process.
> > > In this case the opinion formation may
> > > be clear and the messages heard by the
> > > RD representatives. The process may not
> > > be a free public sphere process any more
> > > but if it is well managed it may
> > > represent in many aspects the true
> > > feelings of the people quite well
> > > (~= "official continuous polls").
> > 
> > No longer of the public sphere?  That makes me think that the
> > institution of PD might have a history like that of Parliament.
> > Parliament was once situated in the public sphere ...

[I was wrong.  Parliament was never in the public sphere.  It only had
a relation with the public, a relation that has since been lost.]

The idea of capturing PD is interesting.  The support IT does have an
administrative component, so it would be a natural capture for
government, or for a business firm (administrators par excellence).
If captured, PD either is, or isn't deliberately hampered.  If it
isn't, then there is no effect - nothing to discuss.

If PD *is* deliberately hampered, then the captor must have accepted
the premise of probable DD, and be acting in response to the perceived
danger of it - either in protection of its own narrow interests, or of
the broader interests of society.  Furthermore, the mode of capture
may itself pose a danger.  So maybe we can discuss this in the parent
thread, later - it probably has no bearing on the premise.


[1] For an overview of projects currently developing the IT, see:
    http://zelea.com/project/votorola/compare.xht

-- 
Michael Allan

Toronto, 647-436-4521
http://zelea.com/