[EM] Range Voting vs Condorcet (Greg Nisbet)

[Jobst Heitzig]

Dear Greg,

you wrote:
> Group membership is difficult to define. With ranked ballots it's 
> simple, but in the majority criterion debate, I argue that a score of 
> 60% represents 60% of a first preference, not the preference between 59% 
> and 61%. 

Sorry, I don't get your meaning here.

However, it seems to me that there is a confusion about the usage of the 
term "majority" in the context of our debate. In the majority criterion 
and related criteria, we usually don't speak of *the* majority, 
referring to one specific subset of the electorate, but we refer to *a* 
majority, by which we mean *any* subgroup consisting of more than half 
of the voters.

For example, consider the classical cycle of true preferences, where
   voter X ranks A>B>C
   voter Y ranks B>C>A
   voter Z ranks C>A>B.

In this situation, there are three different majorities: {X,Y}, {Y,Z}, 
and {Z,X}. Of course these groups are not disjoint and it makes no sense 
to speak of "the" majority. Rather, the majority criterion only requires 
that each of these groups, should they decide to do so, can overrule the 
third voter. That is, X and Y can cooperate in overruling Z and making 
sure B wins. Likewise (but not at the same time of course), Y and Z 
could agree to elect C. So, it usually makes no sense to speak of "the" 
majority since most often there are lots of majorities - it all depends 
on which of these groups happens to make the deal to overrule the rest.

 > ... we have not settled the issue of simultaneous
> majorities. 

See above for clarification. There is no issue of "simultaneous" 
majorities, the criterion simply requires that each subgroup of more 
than half of the voters has a way of overruling the rest. It does not 
require that two such subgroups can do so at the same time, which is 
obviously impossible.

I continued:
>     While of course civil rights are very important to make sure that
>     no-one's basic *rights* are violated, they cannot make sure that
>     everybody's *preferences* are have a fair chance of influencing
>     decisions that are made *within* the limits the civil rights pose.
>      

to which you replied:
> Let me explain my point. I set the bar fairly high for tyranny of 
> majority i.e. it must constitute actually oppressing me and not merely 
> annoying or inconveniencing me to be labelled tyranny. 

I don't care for the label "tyranny". My point is that when a majority 
is able to overrule the rest with certainty, then that's not democratic.

> You talk about the destruction of 
> democracy. 

Did I? I don't think so. I don't think there has been any large-scale 
truly democratic system yet. Only some families and small groups often 
decide in an approximately democratic way when they make sure that each 
member of the group makes a decision at some point in time, for example 
by letting the members decide in turn.

> That democracy is an all-or-nothing type thing. I am arguing 
> that a good constitution will prevent a majority from acting in such a 
> way that democracy itself is subverted. 

Not when the constitution allows the majority to decide all issues 
without having to be concerned about other peoples wishes.

> If you argue instead that 
> suboptimal results come about, yes I agree with you. 

My point is not the "optimality" of results, whatever that may mean. To 
define and ensure optimality is a large but different task than to 
ensure the democratic right to influence the decision.

For example, some philosophers argued that it would be optimal if some 
highly intelligent, well-informed and impartial person (the 
"philosopher-king") decided all issues. Though I tend to agree that this 
might give "optimal" results, such a system would obviously be not a bit 
democratic.

On the other hand, simply drawing a random ballot to decide is perfectly 
democratic since it gives each voter exactly the same power regardless 
of factions. However, that method would not give "optimal" results at 
all since compromise options would get no chance at all. What is missing 
here is an incentive to cooperate.

So, whether a method is democratic and whether it leads to "optimal" 
results are just two questions which are in large part (but not totally) 
independent. This is why we developed FAWRB, a method which gives each 
voters the same power but gives them also strong incentives to cooperate 
in finding and electing good compromise options.

> Again, you speak about actively preventing the majority from doing 
> something that violates the rights of minority. Such cannot be prevented 
> by any voting method! 

Excuse me! Of course it can. I have demonstrated this over and over. 
With FAWRB, the worst a majority of, say, 55% of the electorate can do 
to the minority is to bullet-vote for the option considered worst to the 
other 45%, thus assigning 55% of the winning probability to that option. 
But this is not violating the minorities rights since at the same time 
those 45% of the voters can assign the remaining 45% of the winning 
probability to their favourite by bullet-voting for that option, making 
sure it wins with at least a fair share of the probability.

However, behaving in this way will most often be ridiculous for both 
factions. They would both be far better off when they instead figured 
out a good compromise option C and marked C as a "good compromise" on 
their ballot, in addition to marking their favourite option as 
"favourite". Doing so would make sure C is elected with certainty and 
both factions would gain from this.

You might argue that under Range they could also honestly give C its 
fair rating so that C would also win under Range. But the point is that 
the larger faction would be idiotic to do so.

> Voting methods differ in their ability to 
> elect winners best for society, but I guess you already know that.

Yes, I even know that it is nearly impossible to agree upon what "best 
for society" is supposed to mean. We had lots of discussions about this 
and there are a lot of different and conflicting measures of "social 
utility" or "social welfare" on the market. I personally think that this 
  cannot be solved and, what's more, that it is not ultimately relevant 
either. This is because contrary to utilitarians I do not believe it can 
be justified to sacrifice an individuals personal rights to increase 
some measure of social utility. When 10 persons in a life-boat are 
starving, they may still not eat one of them without that person's 
agreement, although that would qualify as the option "best for the 
group" according to utilitarians (since otherwise all 10 would die). 
Horrible.

In my view, group decisions are not about electing the "right" option or 
the "best" option (since there is no such thing), but about balancing 
different individuals' preferences and giving each individual the same 
chance to get what they want.

> This discussion of what democracy is and is not does not appear to be 
> leading anywhere. I'll answer this claim by saying that the majority is 
> not disenfranchising the rest of the people. It means that majority 
> opinion is the most reliable barometer of utility. 

This is a very interesting new point indeed! So you really think there 
is such a thing as "social utility"? And, what's more, you think 55% of 
the voters know better than the other 45% what that is? And, even 
better, you think this subgroup has the whole society's welfare on their 
minds instead of just their own? Well, while that may be so in some few 
societies such as Bhutan, it certainly is not the case in any western or 
African society I know of. We already discussed the frequent example of 
ethnic or religious minorities oppressed by a majority by seemingly 
"democratic" methods - yuck!

> Think of it as a collection of single decisions. A majority at some 
> point in the distant past has decided something that almost everyone 
> disagrees with now, should the current majority be able to change that 
> past decision? Majoritarians say sure.

Did I say no? This is an altogether new question, so why pose it here?

> If the majority isn't deciding, then a minority is. 

Er? Perhaps I did not make it clear after all: Democracy demands that 
*no subgroup* has the power to decide alone. Neither a majority nor a 
minority. *All* voters decide together, using a method which makes sure 
each of them has the same power since each of them control the same 
amount of winning probability.

> Given a large 
> electorate it is not possible to construct a scneario such that if any 
> one person voted differently the result would change. Hence the minority 
> in a majoritarian method wouldn't have a real impact and majoritarians 
> say it would be foolish to allow them to. 

It's not foolish but democratic to let everyone have the same impact in 
a group decision.

> The initial point still stands, if a majority isn't deciding the result 
> would be handed over to the decision of a minority, which is paternalism 
> and evil blah blah blah.

See above. You still seem to think that the only alternative to majority 
rule was some sort of oligarchy. There are quite simple methods which 
prove you wrong, and I cited them a lot of times.

> The difference here being that a majority is fundamentally different 
> than a minority because it has more people.

That is not a fundamental difference but only a quantitative one. And 
because a majority has more people it gets *more* power in a democratic 
method than the minority. But that's the extent of it. It gets more but 
not *all* power. What's so difficult to understand in this?

> Not shifting the focus. I am trying to say that none of any of this is 
> based on utility or even theoretical pseudo-utility. It is all based on 
> a categorical imperatives.

That categorical imperative being? My categorical imperative is not to 
take decision rights from minorities!

> Where are the archives? I'm new at this.

Ah, OK, that explains something. You go to www.electorama.com (a nice 
wiki on election methods related to this community) and follow the link 
to the archives.

A final remark: I really appreciate it much to have you join our list 
since you bring in a lot of good new thoughts. So, please don't take me 
wrong if I'm arguing a little tough sometimes :-)

Yours sincerely,
Jobst