[EM] Range Voting vs Condorcet (Greg Nisbet)

[Raph Frank]

On Sun, Oct 12, 2008 at 1:42 AM, Greg Nisbet <gregory.nisbet at gmail.com> wrote:
> I was attempting to make a distinction between an active and a passive
> majority. Any active majority (one unwilling to make any compromises
> whatsoever, voting every non-them candidate the lowest possible score) will
> win. A passive majority (clear majority opinion, but makes compromises) will
> not necessarily win. I argue this isn't a fault because if a majority is
> passive then they can arguably be considered to support another candidate
> the percentage that they voted for him. E.g. their partial vote could be
> used to form a majority per se.

Also, they have agreed to give up their power.

> That leads me to the main problem with Range (as with any other majoritarian
> method): It is simply not democratic. It cannot be because every
> majoritarian method gives 100% of the power to less than 100% of the people
> (the "demos" in greek).

They do have an equal vote.  The move the median in their direction.

However, you do get degenerate societies where there is a majority
that is a bloc.

In Northern Ireland, for example, the Unionists have a majority.  This
led to discrimination of the Nationalist minority.

The problem with this majority is that it is solid and unchanging.

Ideally, majority should just mean the group of more than 50% on a
particular issue.  Every person should sometimes be part of the
majority and sometimes part of the minority.  If a certain group of
people are always part of the minority, then this leads to a poorly
functioning society.  Decisions are not made on the basis of what is
best, but are made on the basis of who the proposer was.

> "Advocates of majoritarianism argue that majority decision making is
> intrinsically democratic and that any restriction on majority decision
> making is intrinsically undemocratic. If democracy is restricted by a
> constitution which cannot be changed by a simple majority decision then
> yesterday's majority is being given more weight than today's;

True, constitutions cannot defend themselves and it is paternalistic
to not allow them to be changed.

Ofc, in a federation, it is a little different.  It consists of two
levels of demos(es?).  Should a majority of the federation be allowed
to change the constitution.  Perhaps, it would be allowed, but if
there is a change, there would be a process for States to withdraw.

In Ireland, the constitution can be changed by a majority.  Calling
the referendum requires a majority in the Dail (PR House).  A majority
in the Seanad (not proportional) speeds up the process but isn't
technically required.  Once the referendum is called a simple majority
is sufficient for the amendment to pass.

Germany has 'eternal' provisions.  Some amendment proposals can be
blocked by their Constitutional Court.  This I think is undemocratic.
The eternal provisions relate to fundamental rights, which is their
reasoning.

--- 'someone' wrote:
> Then let me challenge you right away: I don't understand at all what those
> numbers a range-ballot asks me for are supposed to mean. They are not
> explained but instead it is simply assumed naively that each voter will be
> able to assign meaningful numbers to options.

This is true.  I think after the first election people will get the
message to approval vote at least the top 2.

> Let's look to Australia and Ireland for evidence of the impact of IRV,
> particularly Ireland. You might have seen pictures of campaign posters
> advocating a certain person for spot #1 and others for #2 or #3. Or one
> could observe the preference-swapping agreements in Australia. This is a
> direct consequence of later no harm. The parties THEMSELVES share power with
> each other. (In spite of this, both countries have two party systems).

For the President (IRV), Ireland pretty much has a 1 party system.
Labour won once, and FF won all the other times.

Though the Dail (PR-STV) doesn't have a two party system.

The seat totals are

FF: 77
FG: 51
Lab: 20
Green: 6
SF: 4
PD: 2
Ind: 1
Ind: 1
Ind: 1
Ind: 1
Ind: 1
CC: 1 (chairman)

The effective number of parties is:
3.06

Assuming that the independents are a single party give 3.05

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Effective_number_of_parties

> My best guess regarding Condorcet/Range's impact is this: the parties will
> be campaigning in the same areas more and more, trying to improve their own
> position in the same demographic. Campaigns will be less negative because
> you have more than one opponent. Attacking that opponent will help your
> rivals as well, so it's a waste of your effort. Explicit preference swapping
> agreements will be rarer under Condorcet and nonexistent under Range, but
> they will be campaigning in other parties' turf when they think they can
> improve that group's opinion of them just a little.

The same arguement can be applied to PR-STV as transfers are
essential.  However, you also need to 'lock-down' your personal
supporters, so some attacking is necessary.