[EM] Fwd: Range Voting vs Condorcet (Greg Nisbet)
Greg Nisbet
gregory.nisbet at gmail.com
Thu Oct 16 18:56:53 PDT 2008
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Greg Nisbet <gregory.nisbet at gmail.com>
Date: Thu, Oct 16, 2008 at 6:51 PM
Subject: Re: [EM] Range Voting vs Condorcet (Greg Nisbet)
To: Jobst Heitzig <heitzig-j at web.de>
Cc: election-methods at lists.electorama.com
Dear Jobst,
> I will focus on the question of majoritarianism in this message.
>
> First my working definition of "majoritarian method": A method is
> majoritarian if for every option X and every group G consisting of more than
> half of the voters, there is a way of voting for G which makes sure X wins
> regardless of how the voters outside G vote. In other words: Any majority
> can overrule the rest if that majority votes in a certain way.
Group membership is difficult to define. With ranked ballots it's simple,
but in the majority criterion debate, I argue that a score of 60% represents
60% of a first preference, not the preference between 59% and 61%. Range is
also majoritarian in the sense that a majority can impose its will on
people. This is not true of, say, Borda. So in short, the majority criterion
as most people define it is not even applicable to Range Voting, as we have
not settled the issue of simultaneous majorities. This might seem overly
technical and missing the point, but as long as we are arguing about whether
it satisfies the nominal property and the value of that, such it will
remain.
>
>
> Now for the discussion. I said:
> > That leads me to the main problem with Range (as with any other
> > majoritarian method): It is simply not democratic. It cannot be
> > because every majoritarian method gives 100% of the power to less
> > than 100% of the people (the "demos" in greek). Often, about 60% of
> > the people can consistently impose their will on the other 40%
> > without the latter being given any means at all by the majoritarian
> > method to influence the decision. Of course, this is a problem of
> > most popular election methods, but that does not mean the problem
> > cannot be solved. Democratic decisions are possible but not with
> > majoritarian methods.
>
> To which you replied:
> > Interesting point. I would argue that a compromise candidate is
> > better than a polarizing but barely passing candidate (like FPTP with
> > primaries tends to produce). I'd say this isn't a voting-issues
> > question, but a civil rights question. A nice constitution will help
> > protect you from tyranny of the majority.
>
> While of course civil rights are very important to make sure that no-one's
> basic *rights* are violated, they cannot make sure that everybody's
> *preferences* are have a fair chance of influencing decisions that are made
> *within* the limits the civil rights pose.
>
>
Let me explain my point. I set the bar fairly high for tyranny of majority
i.e. it must constitute actually oppressing me and not merely annoying or
inconveniencing me to be labelled tyranny. Belligerence of the majority is
another issue entirely. You may say where do you draw the line, but just
hear me out. You talk about the destruction of democracy. That democracy is
an all-or-nothing type thing. I am arguing that a good constitution will
prevent a majority from acting in such a way that democracy itself is
subverted. If you argue instead that suboptimal results come about, yes I
agree with you. I advocate Range Voting after all. I too find belligerence
of the majority annoying and unhelpful.
As for the fair shot argument, I have no idea what fair shot actually means.
It is possible, with minimal computation, to determine a Range ballot that
will achieve a specific purpose given necessary information. It is
significantly more challenging/sometimes impossible for the same to be done
with something like IRV (or other iterative methods).
Again, you speak about actively preventing the majority from doing something
that violates the rights of minority. Such cannot be prevented by any voting
method! You speak of comparing utility in this case, voting methods at best
can only simulate this. Preventing tyranny must include some immutable
principles lest the principles that prevent tyranny be abolished. That isn't
democratic. It's useful, very useful, but not democratic. Voting methods
differ in their ability to elect winners best for society, but I guess you
already know that.
>
> > "Advocates of majoritarianism argue that majority decision making is
> > intrinsically democratic and that any restriction on majority
> > decision making is intrinsically undemocratic.
>
> I wonder how they do so. It's as simple as that: When any group of people,
> be it a single person (dictatorship) or a small group (oligarchy) or a large
> group (majoritarianism) can overrule the rest, that's not democratic since
> democracy in its main sense requires that *all* people must have a means to
> influence decisions.
This discussion of what democracy is and is not does not appear to be
leading anywhere. I'll answer this claim by saying that the majority is not
disenfranchising the rest of the people. It means that majority opinion is
the most reliable barometer of utility. I disagree, but don't misunderstand
the point. The current majority is the current optimal result is the point.
>
>
> > If democracy is
> > restricted by a constitution which cannot be changed by a simple
> > majority decision then yesterday's majority is being given more
> > weight than today's;
>
> We may later discuss shifting majorities, but please let us first continue
> discussing a single decision since that is complicated enough.
Think of it as a collection of single decisions. A majority at some point in
the distant past has decided something that almost everyone disagrees with
now, should the current majority be able to change that past decision?
Majoritarians say sure.
This says that even if a majority supported the Constitution initially, it
is still a violation of majoritarian principle to impose it when the current
majority disagrees with it, see?
>
>
> You continue to ask:
> > ... if not the majority, then who decides?
>
> Simple answer, contained in the definition of "democracy": It's not a
> subgroup of the voters which decides but its *all* voters who decide.
>
> I guess your real question is not who decides but how they do it.
If the majority isn't deciding, then a minority is. Given a large electorate
it is not possible to construct a scneario such that if any one person voted
differently the result would change. Hence the minority in a majoritarian
method wouldn't have a real impact and majoritarians say it would be foolish
to allow them to. Society as a whole is still deciding by one definition of
the word, but the majority is getting its way all else irrelevant hence it
is deciding here by the definition I originally used.
The initial point still stands, if a majority isn't deciding the result
would be handed over to the decision of a minority, which is paternalism and
evil blah blah blah.
(I do not actually agree with any of that, it is just the point)
>
>
> > If you
> > delegate the responsibility to some group (even yourself) to judge
> > what is best for society, then you are imposing your will on people.
>
> Right. That would be much worse. But essentially majoritarianism *does*
> delegate the decision to some group (the majority that finally overrules the
> rest). The only difference is that it does not prescribe who belongs to this
> group. Rather, any willing majority can establish itself as this deciding
> group. But this is not much better because some group overrules the rest
> anyway. The whole point of democracy is that *no* group can overrule the
> rest, neither a predefined group nor a group that establishes itself as a
> majority.
The difference here being that a majority is fundamentally different than a
minority because it has more people.
>
>
> > Arguments both for and against majoritarianism both tend to boil down
> > to rights. Do you have the right to non-interference from the
> > majority? Does the majority have the right to non-interference from
> > you?
>
> Please don't shift the focus. The question is not whether some group can
> intefere but whether some group can overrule. So, the right everyone should
> have is the right not to be overruled by a majority without my preferences
> having any chance to influence the result.
Not shifting the focus. I am trying to say that none of any of this is based
on utility or even theoretical pseudo-utility. It is all based on a
categorical imperatives.
>
>
> Probably you still think, how on earth could this be achieved? But it is
> very easy to see that real democratic decisions are possible. Just imagine
> everyone marks their favourite option and then a ballot is drawn at random
> to decide the winner. Of course I don't suggest to use this method called
> Random Ballot. It is only to illustrate that the requirement of "democracy"
> can be met.
>
> The real task now is to find methods which are not only democratic but also
> satisfy other criteria (like anonymity, neutrality, monotonicity,
> clone-proofness etc.) and are efficient in electing good compromise options.
> This is achieved by the methods D2MAC and FAWRB for example - you make look
> them up in the archives.
Where are the archives? I'm new at this.
Gregory Nisbet
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